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modern language notes

VOL. LXXIII, NO. 6, JUNE 1958

A Kenning for Blood?

Þjóð 3, 32 and Anon. XIII B 60

Certainly the formal structure of the kenning was in general inviolable. Still, there do seem to exist, though not as a general concession by any means, particular kennings in particular contexts with particular justification for formal irregularity.

A case in point is Þjóð 3, 32 existing in a single manuscript, the third grammatical treatise AM 748 4°. In *Den Tredje og Fjærde Grammatiske Afhandling i Snorres Edda*, København, 1884, edited by B. M. Olsen, there is this text,

Let hrętrana hveiti
hrynja gramr or bryniv
vill at vexti belli
valbygg haralldr yggjar.

The text in *Den Norsk-Islandske Skjaldedigtning*, Finnur Jónsson ed., København, 1912-15, vol. 1 A, p. 376, differs only in printing hrę tņa for hrętrana. From this Finnur Jónsson has hręteina in his normalized text.

In the photo copies of the manuscript, *Corpus Codicum Islandicorum medii ævi, Fragments of the Elder and the Younger Edda*, København, 1945, AM 748, p. 13r, line 3, the abbreviation above the t

seems to be more characteristic of the *r*-vowel combination. I venture this presumption only because B. M. Ólsen has already set the precedent and because the text in *Skjaldedigtning* does look as though it were not uninfluenced by a predetermined reading. The result which Finnur Jónsson has (*op. cit.* 1 B, p. 346) is,

Lét hræteina hveiti
hrynja gramr ór brynju;
vill at vexti belli
valbygg Haraldr Yggjar.

"Kongen lader pilene [*hræteina hveiti*] falde ned fra brynjen (?); Harald vil, at valdyngen (?) tiltager." The question marks are Finnur Jónsson's. I have followed his translation with the immediately relevant portion of the Old Norse text in brackets. The second kenning, that for "valdyngen," is *Yggjar valbygg*.

The text which B. M. Ólsen offers is the same except for the kenning *hrætrani* = "raven"]'s *hveiti* = "blood" and the interpretation *Yggr*]'s *valr* = "raven"]'s *bygg* = "blood." Of the former he is certain that it does not mean "ådsel," of the second he expresses himself as uncertain.

The first kenning thus, *hræteina / hrætrana hveiti*, has been translated as "arrows" in *Skjaldedigtning*, "blood" but probably not "ådsel" by B. M. Ólsen and "Leichen" by Rudolf Meissner in *Die Kenningar der Skalden*, Bonn und Leipzig, 1921, p. 202.

It is probably proper to eliminate the interpretation in *Skjaldedigtning*. First, the manuscript does not justify the text, and second, the kenning is curious and the interpretation as "arrows falling down from the armor" is in itself unsatisfactory.

The manuscript reading *hrætrana* seems to be correct; it gives a kenning absolutely acceptable for "raven" and the concept *hrætrana hveiti*, "the raven's food," whatever its meaning, is quite consistent with skaldic practice.

It is reasonable to assume that Meissner, had he followed the text of B. M. Ólsen, would have listed this kenning still under "Leichen." He lists (*op. cit.* p. 203) *blóðorra barr*, "the barley of the blood-heathcock" and *sveita svans grð* "the crop (grain) of the blood-swan" under kennings for "Leichen." These B. M. Ó. calls blood kennings (*op. cit.* p. 220). Similarly Meissner (p. 202) lists *Yggjar valbygg* as "Leichen" and his reasons for doing this, and the basis for his disagreement with an interpretation such as that of B. M. Ó., is his

necessity for formally classifying as blood kennings only such raven's food as has for a base word a liquid: *tár*, *ó*, *mynni*, or the like.

To this *fjorthung*

Lét hrætrana hveiti
hrynja gramr ór brynju,

the text can be given without disagreement as "the chief made the raven food run out of the mail." There is not here the beautiful consistency of base word and verb that appears in the other *fjorthung* but it should be noted in passing that the juxtaposition of *hveiti* and *bygg* in the same helming is hardly fortuitous. Meissner himself concedes the principle of kenning ambiguity. He says (p. 203), "Bei Grundwörtern, die im allgemeinen Mahl, Verzehr bedeuten, kann natürlich auch Blut angenommen werden." The "man" in this sentence is the poet, not the scholar.

The determining factor for the meaning of *hrætrana hveiti* ought to be the context in which the kenning occurs. In this case *hrynja ór brynju* makes it necessary to find a significance for raven food consistent with the verb *hrynja*.

This verb is found in several problematical contexts and although Finnur Jónsson (*Lexicon Poeticum Antiquæ Linguae Septentrionalis*, København, 1931, 2°) assumes a meaning "falde med knall eller klang," the notion of noise as an implication of this verb is an assumption for skaldic verse and one not actually well substantiated. The basic meaning involved in the passage is the notion of "collapse" or "falling freely." This contention is substantiated in a separate collection of examples presented further on. The meaning relevant for this context is "flow" or perhaps "gush." This is consistent as well with the base word of the kenning, *hveiti*. There is even a naturalistic reference right at hand. The punctured sack of grain lets the contents flow in a manner more than sufficient to suggest the flowing of liquid, and for kenning origins naturalistic sources are a normal point of departure. The suggestion of the language is not the shucking of a body out of armor but the exudation of blood, or for that matter, flesh, from a well-placed cut.

This latter however is merely by the way and not even essential. The consistency of final, transferred meaning, of significance in translation, is impossible because it is not always possible to specify the exact final meaning of the combination which forms the kenning. It is not necessary or essential for the poet to have had in mind

precisely what that suppuration, which he describes metaphorically as "wheat," actually must have been since he was concerned essentially with the metaphorical consistency of the whole of his sentence. So that, although this must be considered with caution, the context of the kenning and its use in that context are a more primary consideration than its formal structure and meaning. That is, the presence of a base word other than the formally customary one meaning "liquid" is less significant than the fact that the combination of *hveiti* with *trani* exists. And now the verb, meaning as it does "to flow," determines perforce the ultimate significance of the kenning.

The use of verbs with kennings occurs in two distinct fashions: where the verb is consistent with the meaning of the base word as such and where the verb is consistent with the meaning of the kenning as a whole. In either case there are instances in which the verb is appropriate in only one respect. In the one case a metaphorical transfer of meaning must be made for the verb; in the other the metaphorical transfer is immediately offered by the solution of the kenning. As an instance of the first case we have a kenning such as *sáreldr*, "sword," used with the verb *brenna*, and *brenna* means then metaphorically "to cut." As an instance of the second case we have the verb *eggja* with the kenning base *bygg*. In particularly successful constructions the verb and the base are consistent in both frames of reference, and this is in point of fact the case in the second *fjorthung* of this helming. This is not necessary to skaldic practice although its successful accomplishment is a matter for separate and detailed consideration.

With or without the sack of grain as a suggestive device this kenning still means "blood."

The second *fjorthung*

vill at vexti belli
valbygg Haraldr Yggjar

though it has a kenning with a base word equivalent to the base word in the first *fjorthung*—*bygg* and *hveiti*—and though it is well nigh identical in form with the first kenning, cannot be the same. The context requires the kenning to mean "dead men." The consistency of figure in this instance has nothing to do with the translated text nor with the extended meaning. As with the previous kenning the suggestion is that a kenning can be invented for a specific syntax as well as for a specific idea or situation.

The kenning base of the second fjorthung occurs in a similar use elsewhere, Anon. XIII B 60. There is a syntactical unit which reads in *Skjaldedigtning* 2 B p. 159,

Eggjar öld seggjar
Yggjar fagrbyggja.

The figure is not consistent and probably Snorri would have called such a figure *nykrat* as opposed to the entirely appropriate verbal arrangements in *belli vexti bygg*. Finnur Jónsson translates the kenning *Yggjar fagrbygg* as "pilebygen" which arrives at the meaning by postulation or at least avoids the question. Meissner (*op. cit.*, p. 202) lists it under "Leichen."

The essentials of this kenning are precisely those of the other. *Fagr* is sannkenning element; the essential kenning is *Yggr*'s *bygg*; and the crop which Odin harvests is the men on the field of battle who are transported to *Valhöll*. *Seggjar* is a clarifying sannkenning element to the whole kenning on the order of *barrhaddaða* to *biðkvén* in Hallfred's *lausavísa* 3, where *barrhaddaðr*, "leaf-haired," is clarifying but not essential to a kenning "Odin's woman" which is complete in its meaning "earth" without this elucidation. Similarly *seggja* clarifies the kenning so that the whole phrase is *Yggjar seggja fagrbygg*, "Odin's fine warrior crop," and without the formally superfluous sannkenning elements is *Yggjar bygg*, "Odin's crop," but in any case "the dead." This construction is abnormal but then so is any other since those kennings which have "crop" as a base word, *ár*, *barr*, etc., are otherwise keyed with "raven, wolf" or a comparable expression.

Finnur Jónsson's translation, "they urged battle," is ultimately correct, but it is arrived at only by dealing first with the kenning *öld eggjar Yggjar byggja*, "the men urge on (the production of) corpses," and by deriving afterwards the obvious metaphorical meaning from this, "they pressed battle." There is not, however, a kenning for "battle," only a metaphor derived from a kenning. But in view of the formality of skaldic structure it is probably wise to keep such distinctions in mind. Conspicuous is the failure to have supplied an appropriate verb and one is tempted to some historical speculation, to thinking that this kenning is a derivative inherited from the verse of Þjóðólfr where the language, involving the same kenning but by no means the same verb, is singularly appropriate. But in both in-

stances the kennings mean what Meissner calls them, "Leichen," at least technically.

Now the fjorthung

vill at vexti belli
valbygg Haraldr Yggjar

is almost certainly what B. M. Ólsen wants to make it, "Harald wants to make Odin's crop grow." The figure is beautifully consistent, the verb and the kenning case correspond, and this is true incidentally whether we can solve the kenning exactly or not, whether the kenning means either "blood" or "corpses."

As B. M. Ólsen suggests (*op. cit.*, p. 222), "Der ligger et dobbelt ordspil i denne kending, idet *valbygg* i sig selv kan betyde en art byg og tanken tillige ved '*val*' henledes på *valen*, de faldne."

Actually there is a triple pun, even a quadruple if you include the meaning of the sentence *Haraldr vill, at bygg belli vexti*, "Harald wants a crop to grow," remembering that he in the first helming let the grain, raven food, flow out of the chain mail.

What Harald wants to make grow is *val* in the sense of *val*- "choice," which is to say Odin's precious crop, a reasonable terminology for the human lives harvested to *Valhöll*; second, *Yggjar valr*, "the raven's" food; and third, *valbygg*, with B. M. Ólsen, "Odin's corpse crop."

Finnur Jónsson in *Skjaldedigtning* and *Lexicon Poeticum* follows the principle that a translation must be found for the kenning and, lacking that, the text is uncertain. The principle indicated by B. M. Ólsen is that the double entendre is intentional. This latter standpoint describes the text.

There is in fact no single correct translation. This is to say that the poet's ability to produce complications was considerable, a matter on which this stanza offers more evidence than just the kenning, and that the meaning of the stanza is in fact the complex of suggested meanings. The kenning is not simply a nominal compound; it is a nominal compound in a possible variety of syntaxes.

On this basis considerable plausibility can be urged for the basic meaning "raven food" for both helmings since this would offer a nice consistency and this in spite of the fact that to do so would be to assume that the kenning translated as "raven food" in one instance is "blood" and in the other "bodies." Such a reading presumes certain considerations for syntactical consistency which are normally assumed for the formal structure of the kenning.

hrynja

In a discussion of Háf 1 Ernst Albin Kock ("Notationes Norrœnæ," in *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, 1923-43, number 1806) refers to Konstantin Reichardt's remark on this stanza in *Studien zu den Skalden des 9. und 10. Jahrhunderts*, 1928, Leipzig, p. 113 to the effect that "Mit dem Verbum *hrynja* ist der Begriff der Bewegung verknüpft . . . *dynja* mit dem Begriff des Phonetischen." To this Kock adds, "Båda begreppen, rörelse och ljud, kunna vara förknippade med båda verben." As far as *hrynja* is concerned it appears that Kock is wrong, and in those instances in which Finnur Jónsson, Fritzner and Cleasby-Vigfusson include the concept of sound with this verb they appear to be equally in error. (Finnur Jónsson, *Lexicon Poeticum Antiquæ Lingvæ Septentrionalis*, København, 1931, 2°; Johan Fritzner, *Ordbog over Det gamle norske Sprog*, 3 vols., Oslo, 1954, 2°; Richard Cleasby and Gudbrand Vigfusson, *An Icelandic-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1874.) There is in fact no instance of this verb in poetry, at least where interpretation involving sound is advisable. In some instances it is not even possible.

In Cleasby-Vigfusson the general definition given for *hrynja* is concerned with motion, in particular "to stream," "to float" as of garments or keys hanging from the belt, the examples cited. In Fritzner, where the verb is quoted "om Bølger," there is no implication of sound and the same is true for the citations of *hrynja* used "om flydende, rindende vædske" or in connection with clothing, "falde ned og blive hængende, om klæder o. desl."

The essential point at issue here in prose is its use "om mur" where walls are described as collapsing with this verb *hrynja* and Fritzner refers to SnE in this connection. Examination of this reveals the misunderstanding which led to the series of associations with sound in *Lexicon Poeticum*. This part of SnE is the *Third Grammatical Treatise* where the author attempts to speak of the characteristic of speech in rigidly scientific terms and he discusses the nature of sound like this: "Nú hafa þessir lutir hljóð, sumir rödd ok sumir mál, sem sagt var. Sú er ein grein hljóðs, er þýtr veðr eða vötn, eðr sjór, eðr grjót eðr björg eða jörð hrynir; þetta hljóð heitir gnýr eða þrymr, dynr eða dunur." (*Edda Snorra Sturlusonar*, Hafniae, 1852, vol. 2, p. 46.)

This text can lead to misunderstanding although there was no misapprehension of the verb *hrynja* in the Latin translation which accom-

panies the text. This runs as follows: "Hæ igitur res sonum habent, aliæ quidem vocem, aliæ sermonem, ut dictum est. Una species soni est, quum fremit tempestas vel aqua vel mare, aut quum saxa vel rupes vel terra ruunt, qui sonus vocatur *gnýr* sive *þrymr*, *dynr* sive *dunur*."

Hrynja is translated by "ruo" but the translator's "qui sonus" is misleading. The English of this passage is as follows: Now these things produce sounds, some of them general uttered sounds and some of them what we call speech, as was said before. There is one kind of sound which occurs when wind, wave or water rush, or when earth, rocks or mountains slide; the names for the sound of this sliding are *gnýr* or *þrymr*, *dynr* or *dunur*.

Which is to say that for a visible phenomenon which we call *hrynja* there is a selection of words to describe the audible characteristic as well. Since in the prose dictionaries no audible phenomenon is implied by the use of this verb, the single remaining question is to what extent there is a justification for assuming audible significance for specific poetic texts. The examples in *Lexicon Poeticum* must be taken one by one.

Some uses of *hrynja* with tears are cited. Regardless of interpretations to the contrary these do not imply an audible phenomenon. They are both disputed texts, *Gisli* 5 and *Bj Hit* 2, 2, but the dispute does not militate against this assumption. Similarly there is neither necessity nor any probability that the verb indicated sound when used to describe the flow of blood although since *Lexicon Poeticum* gives a covering definition for *hrynja* of "falde med knald eller klang, fare brusend af sted" it is so implied here. In *Den Norsk-Islandske Skjaldedigtning*, København, 1912-15, vol. 1 B, p. 97 and p. 277 Finnur Jónsson translates with "strömme" and "falde" however.

If there is no specific indication of auditory significance in these passages as they are examined, then there can be no reason to construct one. The normal meaning of *hrynja* has no essential connection with sound whatsoever and it should be pointed out that, if this verb is then to be interpreted as "to make a sound," the burden of proof lies with the assumptions in *Skjaldedigtning* rather than on the other side.

Lexicon Poeticum cites six examples initially. The first is from *Þrymskviða* where *hrynja* is used to describe the action of the keys which form a part of Thor's disguise as a woman. *Látom und honom hrynja lykla* in stanzas 3 and 9. This is not "chime" nor yet "ring";

that is asking too much of this verb. What it does mean is "to stream, float" (Cleasby-Vigfusson) as of clothing, or with Fritzner, speaking of the verbs used with clothing and the like, "falde ned og blive hængende."

The next four examples deal with armour, or rather, with chain mail. To the same complex of meaning as the use of *hrynja* with the keys belong these examples. This is the chain mail of clothlike consistency and not the splendid breastplate of Renaissance times which could ring like a bell when struck properly. The first of these examples is Ht 57 of which the text in *Skjaldedigtning* 2 B, p. 77 is,

Hilmir hjalma skúrir
herðir sverði roðnu,
hrjóta hvítir askar,
hrynja brynju spangir,

Skjaldedigtning has the translation "Fyrsten kemper kraftig med det blodige sværd; de hvide spydskafter knækker, brynjepladerne klinger." "Knækker" extends the misapprehension even further for it is used to translate *hrjóta*, but *hrjóta* again has to do with movement and not with noise. Now it is perfectly possible for the poet to have used in the same helming a verb with an auditory significance and one with ocular significance. Still, these two lines do form a pair of ocular images and in fact the whole helming is concerned with ocular, not auditory, image derivatives. There is at the very least no reason to assume an implication of sound for the verb *hrynja* in this passage and some small reason to the contrary, particularly when you consider that the basic definition has nothing to do with sound.

The translation of the last two lines of Ht 57 is "the bright spears swing, the chain mail ripples." They may make some noise but the poet does not comment on this.

The next case is Hálfs VI [sic] B 10. It is pertinent to examine the whole stanza from the text in *Skjaldedigtning* II B, p. 280.

Hrynja of herðar
þeims hamalt fylkja,
grams verðungu,
gyldar brynjur;
þat mun á þxlum
þðlings vinum
ljóst at líta,
sem logi brenni.

"Forgyldte brynjer falder ned over skuldrene på dem der svinefylker, på kongens hirdskare; det vil være lust at se på skuldrene af kongens venner som flammer lued."

Finnur Jónsson's translation of *hrynja* as "falder" is at least more appropriate to the text where, as is plain, the whole stanza talks of visual images. More properly on the basis of the comparable texts it should be "the mail swings from the shoulders of the battle leader" since it is this which gives the image in the second helming, *sem logi brenni*.

The text in Anon. XI lv. 8, *brynja hrynr*, where the context is: "it was a long time ago that the mail swung from my shoulders," suggests that this combination is *brynja* and *hrynja* may be idiomatic of epithetic, probably the latter. In such a case its meaning is whatever is typical for parallel usage. And from this too, and quite suitably for this particular text, the meaning may be reasonably taken to be "swing, fall" in the sense of clothing which in English idiom is said to fall about the feet and so on.

The next group to which auditory meaning is attributed is in usages connected with waves and the sea. There are two such examples. In Refr 4, 5, which is the fifth of five helmings called the *Ferðavisur*, the translation of Finnur Jónsson, to leave aside the difficulties with the kennings here, is (*Skjaldedigting* 1 B, p. 297) "Bølgerne styrter over skipet" although in *Lexicon Poeticum* he lists it under "om bølgernes susende falden." Curiously enough an examination of the other four helmings shows that Refr deals exclusively in visual images of the sea voyage. This in itself is suggestive since a whole selection of auditory kennings stood ready for his use. But he did not use them and consistency suggests that one follow the poet in his practise and attribute to *hrynja* only the meaning for which there is actual attestation, visible movement, "pour, plunge," in English idiom "break."

Frþ 1, 7, *hrynja hóvar bófur* also gives no reason to assume an auditory figure. It presents no evidence at all unless a shade of probability might be induced for ocular images. At any rate no substantiation for an interpretation in connection with sound can be made.

At this point it is clear, and the dictionaries all concur in this, that the general meaning of *hrynja* is the ocular image. Where they connect it with auditory images, they do it for prose in connection with

the SnE text and this is a misunderstanding. In *Lexicon Poeticum* and *Skjaldedigtning* the notion of the auditory image has been assumed for chain mail and waves, which has been seen to be untenable, and for tears and blood which now drop from consideration on their own account. The meaning of *hrynja* in all cases is thus exclusively connected with ocular images, not auditory. There remain only three cases unconsidered. They are Þjóð 3, 32 the genesis of this present discussion, the original case Hárf 1, 1 and an idiom "to slam the door" which occurs in prose and in a verse in the *Edda*, *Sigurðarkviða in skamma* 69.

As for the first of these it is clear that the use of *hrynja* in connection with a blood kenning *hrætrana hveiti*, "the food of the blood crane,"

lét hrætrana hveiti
hrynja gramr ór brynju

like the other blood kennings means "pour" and not "gurgle" or some such equivalent. For the second instance Reichardt's interpretation is absolutely correct and Kock's insistence that both concepts can be attached to *hrynja* is wrong. There remains a single question.

The stanza in *Sigsk*, 69 is:

Hrynja honom þá á hæl þeygi
hlunn blikhallar, hringi litkoð,
ef hánom fylgir ferð mín heðan
— þeygi mun vár for aumlig vera! —

The suggestion is strong that the phrase *hrynja honom á hæl hlunn blikhallar* should have some other interpretation than that which appears in the *Völsungasaga*, but no other consistent interpretation appears feasible and the text must be taken as it stands. This does not militate against the general discussion of the verb *hrynja* which, with the single instance of this Eddic occurrence as an exception, refers to ocular phenomena and means to "swing, float, move or flash."

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Spenser and the

Virgilius Legend: Another Talus Parallel

Although literary prototypes of Spenser's Talus have long been recognized,¹ the sources of the iron flail, with which the man of iron threshed out truth from falsehood, have remained obscure. Classical references to the Cretan man of brass did not mention a flail, and in Warton's opinion this "circumstance . . . is added from our author's imagination."² B. E. C. Davis, however, has cited a medieval analogue in *Huon of Bordeaux*, where two men of brass—each wielding an iron flail—guarded the tower of Dunother.³

The *Lyf of Virgilius*, printed at Antwerp by Jan van Doesborgh (?1518),⁴ contains a closer parallel. Here, as in *The Faerie Queene*, the man of metal employed an iron flail in the cause of law and justice, as an instrument for the suppression of crime. The chapter "Howe the Emperour asked counsayll of virgilius howe the nyghte ronners and yll doers myght be ryd out of the stretes" describes the following incident:

The Emperour had manye complayntes of the nyght ronners and theves and also of great murderynge of people in the nyght in so muche that the Emperour asked counsayll of Virgilius and sayd that he hath great complayntes of the theves that ronnyth by nyght for they kyll many men. . . . Then answered virgilius to the Emperour ye shall let make a horse of coper and a coper man upon his backe hangynge [sic] in his handes a flayll of yron & that horse ye shall do brynge a fore the rowne howse and then ye shall let crye that a man fro henseforth at .x. of the clocke shulde ryng a bell and he that after the bell was ronge in the strete shulde be slayne. . . . And whan this crye was made the roffians set nat a poynt but kept the stretes as they dyd a fore and wolde nat let therfore / & as sone as the bell was ronge at .x. of the clocke than lepte the horse of coper with the coper man thorowgh the stretes of Rome insomuche that he lefte nat one strete in rome unsowght and as sone as he founde any man or woman in the strete he slewe them starke deed insomuche that he slewe a bove .CC. persones or more /.⁵

¹ See John W. Draper, "Spenser's Talus Again," *PQ*, xv (1936), 215-7; *The Faerie Queene, Book Five, A Variorum Edition*, ed. Ray Heffner (Baltimore, 1936), 165-7. Cf. *FQ*, V. i. 12.

² *Variorum*, 166. Draper, 217, suggested that "Spenser probably borrowed" this detail "from the Hussite wars in Bohemia. . . ."

³ B. E. C. Davis, *Edmund Spenser: A Critical Study* (Cambridge, 1933), 124.

⁴ A copy of this rare book is preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford (Douce 40).

⁵ *Lyf of Virgilius*. Cf. William J. Thoms (ed.), *Early English Prose Romances*, New Edition, Revised and Enlarged (London, n. d.), 223.

The same romance provides another, but remoter analogue in the chapter "Howe Virgilius dyed." Virgil's castle

... stode without the cytie of Rome and this enterynge of this Gate was made with .xxiiij. yron flayles and on every syde was there xij. men on ece syde styll a pece smytynge with the flayles never seasyng the oon after the other and no man myght cum in wihtout [sic] the flayles stode styll but he was slayne And these flayles was made with suche a gyn that virgilius stopped them when he lyst to enter in therat but no man els culde fynde the way.⁶

The man of copper or brass, armed with a lethal iron flail was apparently by no means uncommon in medieval legend, and in combining this figure with the classical Talus—also a man of brass—Spenser's innovation was a thoroughly logical one.⁷ The closest analogue to Talus' weapon seems to be the iron flail which Virgilius' copper man wielded to enforce the curfew. For this, as for so many other details in *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser appears to have been indebted to medieval romance.

Oxford, England

JOHN M. STEADMAN

Ethan Brand's Twin

A gain in richness and depth of meaning may be reached in a reading of Hawthorne's "Ethan Brand" if a definition of the relation between Brand and the German showman is reached. Is the function of the man with the diorama vital to an artistic appreciation of the tale? Not only is the German's role vital, but without a true under-

⁶ *Lyf of Virgilius*. Cf. Thoms, 233. *The Wonderful History of Virgilius the Sorcerer, Mediaeval Legends No. II* (London, 1893), a composite narrative compiled from French, Anglo-German, and Neapolitan legends of Virgil, provides a variant version of this story. Here Virgil's castle "was guarded by twelve metal men, six to a side, who ceaselessly and silently beat on the ground before them with flails, and were stopped or set in motion by a hidden mechanism, of which the secret was known only to Virgilius." *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷ Spenser's further innovation—the substitution of an iron for a brazen Talus—was likewise a logical development. Cf. the conventional symbolism of iron to suggest the harsher aspects of justice—Bradshaw's iron hat at the trial of King Charles I, St. Peter's iron key (*Lycidas*, 111) of exclusion from the heavenly kingdom, the "Iron Scepter" (*Paradise Lost*, II, 327) with which God rules the fallen angels.

standing of it, much is lost in the meaning of the story, both structurally and more intrinsically.

Critics have agreed that the man from Nuremberg may be taken as the Wandering Jew. In the legend the Jew rejects the Messiah; this act of rejection, similar in kind to Brand's self-separation from humanity (as in the cases of Esther and the village drunks), this sin shared in common, binds the two men with steel chains. As a counterpart to the Unpardonable Sin Brand carries in his heart pictures, as the showman carries pictures in his showbox, that only Brand can see. Mystery covers what he actually sees when "a curious youth" notes "only a vacant space of canvas." After Brand peers into the box, he says to the German, "I remember you now." And when the German confirms Brand's suspicions, the former lime burner threatens to toss him into the furnace, thus foreshadowing his own death and at the same time underscoring the horror in his inward vision of guilt.

Like Kafka, Hawthorne blends fantasy, mystery, and myth in the tale of the lime burner to give us a higher reality purged of self-deception. And in reaching this level of reality he makes use of a double image—twins in evil, brothers in sin—for a doubly forceful effect.

University of Wisconsin

B. A. SOKOLOFF

Some Revisions in *As I Lay Dying*

In the Introduction to the Modern Library Edition of *Sanctuary* (1932) William Faulkner stated that he "wrote *As I Lay Dying* in six weeks, without changing a word." Whatever he may have meant by this, it has been interpreted to mean that the book was subjected to no revision.¹ Recent scholarship, on the basis of available material for research, has shown that Faulkner is a meticulous reviser. Linton Massey deals with the extensive revision in the special case of *Sanctu-*

¹ For example see: Jack Gordon Goellner, "A Closer Look At 'As I Lay Dying,'" *Perspective*, VII (Spring, 1954), p. 42; Ward L. Miner, *The World of William Faulkner*, Duke Univ. Press, Durham, 1952, p. 116; Olga W. Vickery, "As I Lay Dying," in *William Faulkner: Two Decades of Criticism*, edited by Frederick J. Hoffman and Olga W. Vickery, Mich. State College Press, [East Lansing], 1954, p. 189.

ary, which was revised from galley proof at the author's own expense to make it a work worthy to stand beside his best efforts. James B. Meriwether's newly published checklist of Faulkner's writings calls attention to the previously unnoticed fact that many of Faulkner's individual poems and stories were revised even *after* they first appeared in periodicals.³ Faulkner's manuscripts are not, as yet, available for general study, but the recent exhibition at the Princeton Library, "The Literary Career of William Faulkner," displays manuscript material of all his published works from *The Marble Faun* (1924) to *The Town* (1957). The material on display indicates that revision, intensive revision at all stages, in holograph manuscript, typescript, setting copy, and galley proof is characteristic of the author. It would seem that constant revision and concentrated attention to the smallest details are habitual with Faulkner. *As I Lay Dying* appears to be only a partial exception to this rule. Fortunately for illustration, two manuscript pages of the book, the first and the last, have been reproduced in print.⁴ Though the two pages do not offer much material for study of the author's methods, they are sufficient to indicate that, though in Faulkner's own mind the necessary revisions may have been easy or slight and in a relative sense, compared with the major project of overhauling *Sanctuary*, unworthy of mention, the story was subject to exacting scrutiny and some revision. In particular they are evidence enough to dispell once and for all the myth that Faulkner, inadvertently perhaps, helped to create when he denied changing a word of *As I Lay Dying*.

The first manuscript page of *As I Lay Dying* shows some revision. There are sixteen instances of deletions, most of which likely took place during the composition of the first draft, involving the cutting of more than fifty words. In three cases a word is simply substituted for another word crossed out, and a short sentence is written in the left margin with a line drawn to mark its insertion into the text. Characteristically, Faulkner's holograph manuscripts are written with

³ Linton Massey, "Notes on the Unrevised Gallies of Faulkner's *Sanctuary*," *Studies in Bibliography: Papers of the Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia*, VIII, 195-208.

⁴ James B. Meriwether, "William Faulkner: A Checklist," *The Princeton University Library Chronicle*, XVIII (Spring, 1957), 136-158.

⁴ The first holograph manuscript page of *As I Lay Dying*, dated "25 Octob 1929," is reproduced in Jean Stein, "William Faulkner," *The Paris Review*, IV (Spring, 1956), 32-33. The last page of the same manuscript, numbered "107" and dated "Oxford, Miss./11 December 1929," is reproduced in *The Princeton University Library Chronicle*, XVIII, as illustration V, p. 128 ff.

a very wide left margin to permit just such insertions. Comparison with the printed text⁵ shows more revision. These instances, not apparent in the manuscript, are all minor, being chiefly changes by substitution or deletion, and they do not involve any significant re-ordering of the material. There are two changes, however, which are more important and illustrate the kind of care which Faulkner must have given to the entire manuscript. In the manuscript version the box which Cash is making for his mother, Addie Bundren, is called a coffin. Similarly Addie Bundren is introduced as "Maw." In the printed text "coffin" is deleted and Addie Bundren is named with no statement revealing who she is. The point of both these changes is obvious. In the final version there is a certain strangeness created by the suspense of unanswered questions. The box *may* be a coffin. Who is Addie Bundren, and why will lying in the box give her "confidence and comfort?" Both changes are, of course, direct and deliberate violations of the law of popular or "slick" fiction that the basic problem and the relationships of the characters to each other should be clearly stated at the outset. It is interesting to note that Faulkner's first inclination was to follow this rule, his afterthought to render the first scene more ambiguous and unresolved.

The evidence of the final manuscript page appears to be different, but is, in fact, similar to the first. It is almost clean, showing only one deletion of eight words. Comparison with the printed text shows, however, that the final version is longer by more than fifty words. As in the case of the first page, there is one change that is of some importance. In the final version Faulkner turns off the gramophone the Bundrens were listening to, adding the sentence: "The music was not playing now." This allows him to add to Cash's thoughts on the pleasure and the danger of owning a gramophone, in the sixth paragraph. In the finished text it is the abrupt *absence* of the music which increases its desirability, rather than, as in the manuscript, the effect of listening. Further it gives the author a chance to round out Cash's character by a brief debate between pleasure and practicality in a way which the manuscript version did not. The other changes are much like the changes on the first page, scattered, slight, but purposeful.

In comparison with the type of revision apparent on the manuscript pages shown at the Princeton Library exhibit, the changes of *As I*

⁵ For comparison I used the 1946 Modern Library Edition of *The Sound and the Fury* & *As I Lay Dying*.

Lay Dying are, indeed, minor. The principal difference is that *As I Lay Dying* does not seem to have undergone the significant re-arrangement of material, especially in the order and sequence of events and chapters, which is obviously the case with other manuscripts. Faulkner seems to have had the shape and order of the story in mind, under control from the beginning. He has said as much in a published interview.

Sometimes technique charges in and takes command of the dream before the writer himself can get his hands on it. That is a *tour de force* and the finished work is simply a matter of fitting bricks neatly together, since the writer knows probably every single word right to the end before he puts the first one down. This happened with *As I Lay Dying*. It was not easy. No honest work is. It was simple in that all the material was already at hand.*

Nothing in Faulkner's career is more remarkable than the creation of *As I Lay Dying* with all its complexity and richness in six weeks at the end of 1929. But it would be an error to continue the notion that it was written entirely without revision, almost as a kind of automatic writing. It would be unfair to its author. The available manuscript pages testify that Falkner probably did not have trouble with the large design of the novel. They also witness that he went over it word by word, with a poet's care, to create the final achievement.

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GEORGE PALMER GARRETT

Lucas Burch and the Polarity of *Light in August*

Critics of *Light in August* have paid little attention to Lucas Burch, and the reason is no doubt that his role in the book's events is small. Yet though it is such, Burch's part in the book's meaning is not an unimportant one. It is one carefully conceived to perform a necessary function in the thematic statement, and the failure of critics to consider this function represents a failure to account for the book's theme consistently and adequately.

The theme of *Light in August*, as William Van O'Connor has elaborated for the religious motif and others have generally noted,

* *The Paris Review*, IV, p. 39. Cf. *Faulkner At Nagano*, edited by Robert A. Jelliffe, Tokyo [1956], p. 162.

is built about polar oppositions. The thematic tension exists between two main kinds of values: one, the values of Doc Hines, Simon McEachern, Joanna Burden, and ultimately Joe Christmas, may be termed negative because their effects in action are misery, destruction, death; and the other, largely the values of Lena Grove and Byron Burch, may be termed positive because these result in happiness, constructiveness, promotion of life. This scheme of things is highly useful, but Lucas Burch may not be fitted meaningfully into it; and the reason, I suggest, is that Burch represents a third condition involving values, for he is without values. His position is alternative, opposed, to those both negative and positive; and in this sense he makes the polarity of the book triangular.

More particularly, Burch serves with Christmas and Byron in a thematic triad. In the book's terms, for example, Christmas opposes religion, loathes sexuality, rejects responsibility, and lives in principled isolation; Byron, in contrast, is simply and deeply religious, comes to accept both sexuality and responsibility, and becomes involved in the affairs of men; and Burch, in contrast to both, never shows even an awareness of religion, never rises above unconscious animalism, never recognizes his responsibility, and never becomes a force in society. Where they both achieve direction and self-realization, negative and positive, Burch remains the victim of his lack of order and obliviousness, of the Opponent unpredictable and without reason who he does not realize is himself; and where their lives finally have meaning, Burch's life is meaningless. Christmas ends committed to death, Byron to life, and Burch to neither, to a living nothingness that is not life and not death.

Burch is, then, the direct and obvious foil of Byron throughout the book, and beneath their superficial resemblances the foil of Christmas no less. The resemblances, in fact, Burch's aping of Christmas's mannerisms, his co-involvement in crime, the track to which he is finally committed as Christmas' is all his life to the street, all point up vividly the great underlying difference: that all Christmas does, he is driven to; that all Burch does, he does from his own ineradicable and almost unspeakable folly. In terms of polarity, if the story of Christmas is a tragedy, and if the story of Byron is a comedy, the story of Burch is a cutting satire upon the life without values and therefore without direction and, finally, without worth or importance.

It is through Burch, then, that Faulkner fulfills his theme, brings it to logical completion; and it is toward Burch, what he represents,

that a complementary if relatively smaller criticism is directed. The large emphasis, as O'Connor has shown, falls upon criticism of the negative values, to be sure; and secondarily the book is concerned with affirmation of those positive. But finally *Light in August* criticizes the life without values, as well; and the means of this criticism ignored in past commentary is the merciless ironic treatment given Burch, who ends an object of contempt in his vexation, triviality, chaos.

Earlham College

DAVID L. FRAZIER

A Small Crux in Allen Tate's "Death of Little Boys"

The fourth quatrain of Allen Tate's "Death of Little Boys," since it is rather obscure, has been the subject of two sharply disagreeing commentaries, one by John Crowe Ransom, the other by Yvor Winters. After Mr. Tate pictures the little boys "grown patient" unto death and has evoked the sense of indefinitely overwhelming fear that such death causes in us, he writes:

Till all the guests, come in to look, turn down
Their palms, and delirium assails the cliff
Of Norway where you ponder, and your little town
Reels like a sailor drunk in a rotten skiff.

Of these lines Mr. Ransom writes (in *The World's Body*):

... he does not care to explain the private meaning of ... his Norwegian cliff; or else, by some feat, he permits these bright features to belong to his total image without permitting them to reveal any precise meaning, either for himself or his reader.

And Mr. Winters, bent (in his *Anatomy of Nonsense*) on refuting this example of what he takes to be Mr. Ransom's insistent irrationalism, comments on Mr. Ransom's comment:

The Norwegian cliff is far less mysterious than Ransom assumes; it is an image representing the sense of remote isolation in the face of death and in the experience of grief. The reeling, drunken sailor, and the rotten skiff, are all trite and over-violent; and they are not realized in themselves, any more

than is the cliff. These images represent one of the commonest weaknesses of Tate, Ransom, and their school: a fear of abstract statement in itself, a fear so acute that they will invariably substitute for it a trite, vague, or even badly mixed figure if they can think of one.

The images, however, are not trite or vague; they do have a precise meaning, but only if referred to two likely sources. The first is in *Paradise Lost*, I, 203 ff., in which Milton figures Satan's size as that of a whale which

. . . haply slumbring on the Norway foam
The Pilot of some small night-founder'd Skiff,
Deeming some Island, oft, as Sea-men tell,
With fixed Anchor in his skaly rind
Moors by his side under the Lee, while Night
Invests the Sea, and wished Morn delays.

The second is from one of Andersen's *Fairy Tales*, "The Elf-Hill," in which one of the Elf-King's daughters tells the King of the Gnomes, who is seeking wives for his sons, why her sister has said that she will never marry unless she can go to Norway:

. . . The youngest sister whispered to the old King, "That's only because she has heard in a Norwegian song that when the world sinks down, the cliffs of Norway will remain standing like monuments, and so she wants to get up there, because she is afraid of sinking down."

In the quatrain, then, with the boy's death (for the poem generalizes to its title from a single boy's death), there comes to the "you" of the poem (and perhaps to the "guests" too) a sense that the "little town" (a place of one's own, certitude in this life?) deliriously reels as the cliffs of Norway themselves (life itself?) seem to be sinking down. Somehow, Andersen's cliffs and Milton's whale seem to have coalesced; on this occasion, whatever of vital certitude they represent seems now to be about to disappear. Fittingly, for this is a little boy's death, Andersen's childish fantasy is made to partake almost surrealistically of Milton's sublimity. Certainly Mr. Winter's impression of the intention of the lines is correct; but I think he is incorrect when he claims that intention to be unrealized. It is realized because, *pace* Mr. Ransom, it is precisely, if hyper-allusively, imaged.

Whether or not Mr. Tate is consciously recalling these lines from Anderson and Milton, I have no way of knowing. Anyhow, the precise degree of consciousness is not important. He may have been recalling not "The Elf-Hill" but the "Norwegian song." Or he may, like many of us, have had good cause to realize Andersen's subliminal

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grimness. As for his recollection of the lines from *Paradise Lost*: He writes in his "Note on Donne" (reprinted recently in his paperback *Man of Letters in the Modern World*) of the currents of thought which Milton felt threatened "his own settled belief in the relation between a fixed human nature and a perfect divine order." Such an insight, one could argue, shows a man who has thought seriously about Milton and therefore read and pondered him deeply enough to fix in his mind, for the later use of his creative imagination, a passage in which threat is the major import. In any case, the parallels seem to be there, the quatrain from "Death of Little Boys" thereby deepens and fills out in its precision, its abstraction is defined by its concreteness, and perhaps a crux is settled by source-hunting and criticism of criticism of criticism.

The Ohio State University

ROY HARVEY PEARCE

L'Illusion comique of Corneille: The Tragic Scenes of Act V

Most discussions of the tragic scenes in Act V of *L'Illusion comique* have turned either on the possible source of the scenes or on their function as a play within a play within a play. Almost three decades ago Georges Ascoli advanced the theory that the little tragedy was inspired by English plays, such as those presented occasionally in Rouen by troupes come from England.¹ The hero Théagène, he pointed out, is described as an English lord, and furthermore the violent action of the playlet resembles that of the English theater. Other critics, however, have denied any special significance to Théagène's nationality and have recalled that the contemporary French theater was itself not lacking in turbulence and brutality. According to them, it is much more likely that Corneille was merely following the current French fashion in tragi-comedy.² As for the dramatic function of these scenes, virtually every critic who has mentioned the play at all

¹ G. Ascoli, *La Grande-Bretagne devant l'opinion française au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1930), II, 154-155.

² H. C. Lancaster, *A History of French Dramatic Literature in the Seventeenth Century*, Part II: *The Period of Corneille 1635-1651* (Baltimore, 1932), I, 108. See also, J. Marks, ed. *L'Illusion comique* (Manchester, 1944), p. xix.

has drawn attention to the three levels of theatrical illusion which it contains and has analyzed the means by which Corneille effects a momentary confusion of two of them in Act V. The purpose of the present article is to present some new evidence concerning Corneille's sources—evidence which, I hope, will help shed light on the evolution of Corneille's art at this crucial moment in his career³ and which may also provide a clearer insight into the organic unity of the "étrange monstre" itself.

In Act I of *L'Illusion comique* the magician Alcandre receives a visit from a father who is seeking news about his long-lost son Clindor. Agreeing to help the father, Alcandre promises to conjure up scenes from the son's life away from home. Except for several initial and terminal scenes between the magician and the father, Acts II, III, and IV are concerned with the comic misadventures of Matamore and the love affair and eventual elopement of Clindor and Isabelle. Then, at the end of Act IV, the magician tells the father that a new spell must be cast before they can pass on to the next episode in the life of the young couple:

Je vous les vais montrer en leur haute fortune.
Mais puisqu'il faut passer à des effets plus beaux,
Rentrons pour évoquer des fantômes nouveaux.
Ceux que vous avez vus représenter de suite
A vos yeux étonnés leur amour et leur fuite,
N'étant pas destinés aux hautes fonctions,
N'ont point assez d'éclat pour leurs conditions.⁴

The new spell that needs to be cast is, of course, the spell that governs tragedy, for Clindor and Isabelle will presently be seen engaged no longer in a comic action, as in Acts II, III, and IV, but rather in a tragic action apparently ending in death for both. Corneille and Alcandre are, first of all, preparing a surprise for their respective, unsuspecting audiences, for the tragic action will turn out to be nothing more than part of a play presented by Clindor and Isabelle, who have become actors. But the two dramatists are also making an ironical show of their own virtuosity as spinners of different kinds of

³ At the time he wrote *L'Illusion comique* Corneille was still in the process of making the transition from comedy to heroic drama. The play immediately follows *Médée*, his seventh dramatic work but his first attempt at heroic tragedy, and precedes *Le Cid* by only a few months.

⁴ IV. x. 1326-32. Quotations from *L'Illusion comique* in my text are from the original 1639 version, as reconstructed from the variants given in *Œuvres*, ed. Ch. Marty-Laveaux (Paris, 1862). Two obvious typographical errors have been corrected in accordance with the text of later editions, however.

theatrical illusion. The irony of these lines is heightened if one notes how they incorporate some of the cardinal points of traditional definitions of tragedy. Thus Scaliger writes in his *Poetics*: "Tragœdia, sicut & Comœdia in exemplis humanæ vitæ confirmata, tribus ab illa differt, *Personarum conditione, fortunarum negotiorumque qualitate, exitu*. Quare stylo quoque differat necesse est."⁵ And Alcantre speaks of "leurs conditions," "leur haute fortune," and "[leurs] hautes fonctions." Without taking himself too seriously, Corneille seems to be advising the informed among his audience that he, the writer of half a dozen comedies and one tragedy, has read the critics and knows the magic formula for going from one genre to the other.

This irony may carry over into the playlet itself, or at least into parts of it. The little tragedy consists of two main dialogues, the first between an unnamed man and wife (Théagène and Hippolyte, according to the stage directions), the second between the man and Rosine, wife of Prince Florilame. In the first scene Hippolyte surprises her husband in the moonlit garden where he has arranged a tryst with the Princess. While waiting for Rosine to arrive, Hippolyte attempts to dissuade her errant husband from carrying the dangerous liaison any farther. Her arguments, though telling, are of no avail; yet in the end she triumphs—through the shining example of her own touching fidelity. Now, the situation and characters in this dialogue are often reminiscent of parts of the Medea legend. Like Medea, Hippolyte had forsaken father, home, and suitors and fled to foreign places with a man whom she now reproves for ingratitude and infidelity. And like Jason, Théagène attempts to answer his wife's arguments and justify his present reprehensible conduct. Only the change of heart that closes the scene has no counterpart in the Medea story. The parallels which do exist are furthermore not a mere coincidence, nor an unconscious transposition of the subject matter which the poet had recently treated in his own *Médée*. As the following comparison of texts will show, Corneille was working closely and consciously from Euripides' *Medea*, of which he had made relatively little use in writing *Médée*. There are no parallels in phrasing between the texts of Corneille and Euripides,⁶ but on the other hand the arguments

⁵ Julius Caesar Scaliger, *Poetics libri septem*, 2nd ed. (n. p., 1581), Bk. I, ch. vi, p. 27. Italics added.

⁶ In all likelihood Corneille read Euripides not in Greek, but in some Latin translation. The version used here is that of George Buchanan, as it appears in his *Poemata quæ extant* (Leyden, 1628).

are quite similar and, except for the sixth instance of borrowing noted below, are introduced in the same order:

1. Hippolyte:

Quelle tendre amitié je recevois d'un père!
Je l'ai quitté pourtant pour suivre ta misère;
Et je tendis les bras à mon enlèvement
Ne pouvant être à toi de son consentement. (ll. 1397-1400)

Medea:

. . . prodito patre & domo,
Applicui Iolchon te sequuta, tibi nimis
Hic obsecundans, ac mihi parum providens. (pp. 462-463)

2. Hippolyte:

Si pour te voir heureux ta foi s'est relâchée,
Rends-moi dedans le sein dont tu m'as arrachée.
Je t'aime, et mon amour m'a fait tout hasarder,
Non pas pour tes grandeurs, mais pour te posséder. (ll. 1405-08)

Medea:

Quo nunc revertar? spreta quo me conferam?
An ad penates patrios, ac patriam,
Quam te sequuta prodidi. (p. 463)

3. Théagène:

Ne me reproche plus ta fuite ni ta flamme:
Que ne fait point l'amour quand il possède une âme?
Son pouvoir à ma vue attachoit tes plaisirs,
Et tu me suivais moins que tes propres desirs. (ll. 1409-12)

Jason:

Ingenii acumen acre suppetit tibi: at
Orationis arrogans jactantia est,
Ea quum recenses, quæ coacta feceras
Amore, duris nos ut è laboribus
Eruiere posses. (p. 463)

4. Théagène (who now occupies a high position in society):

Regrette maintenant ton père et ses richesses;
Fâche-toi de marcher à côté des princesses;
Retourne en ton pays avecque tous tes biens
Chercher un rang pareil à celui que tu tiens. (ll. 1421-24)

Jason:

At, ut docebo te, incolumitate ex mea
Plus quam dedisti, ad te redundat commodi.
Primum, Pelasgam, patria pro barbara,
Terram colis, ubi lex & æquitas vigent,
Nec jura cedunt gratiæ vel viribus:

Omnesque doctam te esse Graii intelligunt:
Famaque flores, finibus si in ultimis
Orbis habitares, mentio haud fieret tui. (p. 464)

5. Théagène:

Les femmes, à vrai dire, ont d'étranges esprits!
Qu'un mari les adore, et qu'une amour extrême
A leur bigearre [sic] humeur le soumette lui-même,
Qu'il les comble d'honneurs et de bons traitements,
Qu'il ne refuse rien à leurs contentements:
Fait-il la moindre brèche à la foi conjugale,
Il n'est point à leur gré de crime qui l'égale;
C'est vol, c'est perfidie, assassinat, poison,
C'est massacrer son père, et brûler sa maison. (ll. 1428-36)

Jason:

At eo mulierum crevit impotentia:
Si conjugalis salva sit fides tori,
Tum cuncta recte creditis succedere:
Sin hac sinistra parte quidquam evenerit,
Quae cara fuerant, sunt statim inimicissima.
At quam fuisset procreasse liberos
Aliunde melius, nec fuisse foeminas?
Exempta quantis vita foret hominum malis. (p. 464)

6. Théagène:

Crois-tu qu'aucun respect ou crainte du trépas
Puisse obtenir sur moi ce que tu n'obtiens pas?
Dis que je suis ingrat, appelle-moi parjure;
Mais à nos feux sacrés ne fais plus tant d'injure:
Ils conservent encor leur première vigueur. (ll. 1463-67)

Jason:

Non (quid tibi aegre est) quod torum odissem tuum,
Sponsaque amore saucius forem novæ,
Nec numero ut ulli liberum contenderem:
Sat liberorum est. . . . (p. 464)

7. Hippolyte:

Puisque mon teint se fane et ma beauté se passe,
Il est bien juste aussi que ton amour se lasse. (ll. 1497-98)

Medea:

Non hæc movebat causa te, sed barbaras
Tædas senectam adusque fore putaveras
Parum decoras. (p. 465)

Now Corneille may well have utilized this scene from *Medea* simply because it was the tragic material closest to hand at the moment. But

the "étrange monstre" is full of illusionistic tricks and multiple reflections. And it is not impossible, I think, that he purposely set out to parody his own single tragedy. It is even possible that a consistent pattern of parody extends throughout the whole play: that Alcandre, the master illusionist, is an ironical projection of Corneille himself;⁷ that the amorous intrigue of Acts II, III, and IV is a deliberate reflection of the early comedies of Corneille;⁸ and that in Act V the first of the two main tragic dialogues is an ironic recapitulation of a later stage in his career.

The second dialogue of the little tragedy in *L'Illusion comique* takes place between Théagène and Rosine. Under the influence of his wife's exemplary fidelity and of her vow to kill herself if his liaison with Rosine should end in his death, Théagène has suddenly been transformed into a perfect husband and a staunch defender of marital fidelity. When Rosine appears, he consequently astounds and dismays her by refusing to accept her favors. His skill in sophistry, which a moment ago was turned toward justifying infidelity to his wife, is now directed toward urging his bewildered mistress to return to her husband. In his new-found "generosity" he even invents a face-saving lie by which Rosine could, if she would, extricate herself from the whole embarrassing situation. But the princess demurs, and before anything else can happen, agents of the prince enter and kill both Théagène and Rosine and then carry off Hippolyte to their master.⁹

This second scene again pits the hero against a female adversary and provides a neat reversal, or negative reflection, of the first scene. If one compares the early Théagène with the later, converted Théagène, however, one is tempted to find a further significance to the second scene. The early Théagène resembles not only Jason, but also Alidor, another hero who desires to escape or stay clear of the chafing bonds of matrimony. The "reformed" Théagène, on the other hand, in one important respect resembles such later heroes as Rodrigue, Horace, and Polyeucte. He resembles them because his infidelity to his mis-

⁷ Robert J. Nelson in his article "Pierre Corneille's *L'Illusion comique*: The Play as Magic," *PMLA*, LXXI (1956), 1131 and *passim*, points out that "Alcandre is an extremely Cornelian playwright."

⁸ Robert Garapon in his article "Corneille et Rotrou," *Revue d'Histoire Littéraire*, 50^e année (1950), 385-394, suggests that an unknown Spanish *comedia* may be the immediate source of this part of the play.

⁹ The scene between Théagène and Rosine is omitted from editions after 1657. In these later editions, Théagène is still killed by friends of Florilame, but Hippolyte, instead of being carried off to the prince, dies of shock and a broken heart.

trepreneur can be morally justified as the price of his higher fidelity to his wife, just as the infidelity of Rodrigue, Horace, and Polyeucte to their mistress, friend, and wife respectively is justified by their fidelity to family honor, the state, and God. While Alidor, Jason, and the first Théagène ignore their obligations to a faithful mistress or wife in order only to satisfy their own selfish desires, the second Théagène, on the other hand, like the heroes of the masterpieces, finds himself caught between two moral obligations of different kinds—one to his mistress, the other to his wife. In the terms which Sartre has applied to the Cornelian heroic tradition in general, the new Théagène takes part in a conflict not between a right and a wrong, but between two opposing, though unequal, rights.¹⁰ Like Rodrigue, Horace, and Polyeucte, whom he foreshadows in this respect, the second Théagène moves within the frame of a dramatic situation which allows his disengagement from one cause to appear as the necessary obverse side of an engagement to a higher, nobler cause.

If it is true that in the earlier parts of *L'Illusion comique* Corneille casts an ironic glance at himself, at his comic production, and at his one heroic tragedy up to that time, in this second main scene of the playlet he may be experimenting ironically with a poetic vision to which he has not yet firmly committed himself but which will soon be at the center of the masterpieces. Ironic detachment is one of the eternal postures of the uncommitted, and Corneille in *L'Illusion comique* seems to be no longer committed to comedy and on the other hand not yet entirely committed to a heroic vision of man. The only thing he is willing to embrace wholeheartedly at this point is the theater itself. Looking inward, backward, and forward, he brings his multiple images into focus only through the lens of the theater and of theatricality.

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¹⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, "Forgers of Myths: The Young Playwrights of France," *Theatre Arts*, xxx (1946), 324-335.

Inconsistencies of Characterization in the *Periquillo*

If Lizardi's intention in writing the *Periquillo* was in fact the twofold one of both entertaining and instructing the reader, the construction of the work as a whole reflects the duality of purpose: a section of narrative is followed or interrupted by a section of moralizing commentary, forming a series of alternating blocks.¹ The lessons to be gained, instead of being implied in the telling of the incidents, are thus developed separately in numerous lengthy digressions, which reiterate the faults of *Periquillo* and serve as a reminder that virtue and sin infallibly reap their own rewards. Consciously violating the precept of action and morality intertwined, as he himself points out in the "Apología" of the work, Lizardi follows the pattern of the *Guzmán de Alfarache* in this clear-cut separation of the two.² It is interesting to note, however, that the part of the moralist in the case of the *Periquillo* is taken by the *pícaro* himself after he has made a radical transformation in his way of life and in his ethical standards. Reviewing the previous actions of his entire career, supposedly for the edification of his children, he serves as the mouthpiece for the author in passing moral judgment upon the person he was in the past. But this moral judgment is not available to the protagonist of the narrative, who was not designed by the author to analyze the ways of his fellow men on anything but a very subjective and self-centered level, the *pícaro's* traditional unilateral view of life, at the time of the action of the story. The effect of such a pattern is to give the unreformed *Periquillo* the maximum of liberty with regard to the ethics of his deeds; in fact, *Periquillo* is not so much immoral as amoral, lacking completely the higher standard of values so amply supplied by his conscience as it surveys his former life after the reformation of his character takes place.

Yet there are several instances in which the author, probably through carelessness, puzzles the reader by allowing his protagonist

¹ A slightly abridged version of this article was read on December 27, 1952, at the meeting of the Modern Language Association in Boston.

² One recent edition of Lizardi's work, in fact, has all of the moralizing passages in italics, and suggests that they may be omitted without breaking the continuity of the narration. An interesting analysis of the separation of narration from moralizing commentary as the expression of the Baroque can be found in chapters I and IV of *Lección y sentido del "Guzmán de Alfarache"* by Enrique Moreno Baez (Madrid, 1948). Professor Moreno Baez demonstrates the importance of the "digressions" for an understanding of the work as a whole and of the dominant ideas of the period when Alemán lived.

to adopt a moral attitude contemporaneous with the occurrence of the incident being criticized. The result of the introduction of this attitude is to combine moralizing and action into one indivisible unit, which constitutes a temporary abandonment of the division of the two previously established by Lizardi. One such inconsistency occurs when Periquillo becomes acquainted with the fraudulent beggars. Although only curious and surprised when first informed of the methods used to swindle the charitable public, his mood immediately changes to one of indignation when he discovers that an innocent child is being mistreated in order to spur the generous impulses of potential donors: ". . . Supe con el mayor dolor que aquella indigna madre y despiadada mujer, pellizcaba al pobre inocente cuando pedía limosna, a fin de conmovier a los fieles y excitar su caridad con la vehemencia de sus gritos. No me escandalicé poco con semejante inhumanidad. . . ." ³ The remark taken by itself might be overlooked as an example of a value judgment (although Periquillo is sufficiently impressed by this cruelty to make a major point of it when he informs upon the beggars later on in the same chapter) if it were not the introduction to an eloquent passage in which Periquillo denounces the evil ways of beggars, the stupidity and superstition of the ones who support them, and the pseudo-religious falsities the beggars tell. What is needed, we are told, is the careful examination and reform of such practices.

One cannot help but feel that these ideas and the sentiment which they convey are inappropriate to the character of the protagonist as developed in the book up to this point. Carried away by his own, not Periquillo's, protest, Lizardi has overlooked his previous method of putting commentary upon the action in the guise of advice which the reformed Periquillo gives to his children. The error could have been corrected partially by rewriting a single sentence, which, as it stands, introduces the lengthy passage of moralizing into the time of the incident: "Aturdido me quedé al escuchar tantos despropósitos juntos, y decía entre mí: ¿cómo es posible que no haya quien contenga estos abusos, y quien les ponga una mordaza a estos locos? . . ." ⁴

Another lapse of characterization occurs in the episode of the egoist, whose debate with Periquillo on the subject of human relationships temporarily casts the protagonist in the rôle of a preacher. When the egoist points out that one should be concerned only with what he

³ José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, *El Periquillo Sarniento*, ed. Jefferson Rea Spell (Mexico, 1949), II, 270. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273. The italics are mine.

himself suffers, Periquillo replies that even if he does not suffer, he is moved to pity by the sufferings of his fellow men, whom he must consider his brothers or parts of his own person. He continues in the same vein, declaring that one does not seek friends for what one can obtain from them, aside from their esteem and advice. When the egoist retorts that he will seek only friends that can help him attain material wealth, Periquillo is unable to go on: "Escandalizado al escuchar tan inefables máximas, mudé de conversación y a poco rato me separé de su lado."⁵ Nor is he able to dismiss the matter lightly, for he feels compelled to tell the incident to his master, the colonel, on the following day, in the hope of receiving an explanation of such unusual views. What is curious about Periquillo's reaction, naturally, is that he has committed deeds that are far worse than the egoist's theory. If the cultivation of friendships only for selfish and material ends were the least of Periquillo's sins, he could almost be proud of his conduct. The history of his life before the incident dealing with the egoist, indeed, includes such peccadillos as swindling, theft, outrageous misappropriation of public funds, murder, and plundering a grave. The same Periquillo who is repelled by the idea of self-centered associations has stolen and squandered the small legacy left his mother, seduced the mistress of the man who freed him from jail and gave him a home, had his own mistress seduced by a friend so that he would have an excuse to get rid of her, and treated his wife to beatings and starvation after he tired of her. In short, the Periquillo of the story acted frequently out of the same motives which he denounces here. By assigning ethical sentiments to him during the progress of the action, the author causes him to usurp the function of the reformed and moralizing Periquillo.

There are other passages also, which although they are not apparent violations of the novel's dual structure, create an atmosphere of inconsistency and contribute to a feeling of mistrust on the part of the reader. In this connection one thinks particularly of Periquillo's compassion for a patient in the hospital, his shock at the idea of being a common thief, and his remarkably idealistic concealment from the authorities of the identity of his tormenter, Aguilucho, whom he did not want to harm since the poor fellow already had the burden of his crimes to bear.⁶ If it is stated in defense of the author here that Periquillo is meant to have a little kindness and sentiment in his nature even when he is doing wrong, then one must take the opposite

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 331 and 346-348, and II, 55, respectively.

side of the argument to classify as an inconsistency the absolute lack of such feelings in the incident in which Periquillo refuses a loan to a supplicant and needy relative, allows him to be beaten by his servants, and laughs at the injuries that have been inflicted.⁷

The faults of the characterization of Periquillo noted may be considered as part of a more general carelessness which pervades the entire work and which, as critics such as Jefferson Rea Spell have noted, is apparent not only in the choice of words, but also in sentence and paragraph structure.⁸ Lizardi himself admits to a lack of literary discipline at the conclusion of the *Periquillo*, and confesses that he does not have the patience to reread his work, much less to correct it: "Yo mismo me avergüenzo de ver impresos errores que no advertí al tiempo de escribirlos. La facilidad con que escribo no prueba acierto. Escribo mil veces en medio de la distracción de mi familia y de mis amigos; pero esto no justifica mis errores, pues debía escribir con sosiego y sujetar mis escritos a la lima. . . ."⁹ This honest acknowledgment of defects suggests that the inconsistencies in portrayal of character are simply oversights on the part of Lizardi and that he might have noted and corrected them if he had taken the pains to do so.

Even though their presence in the story tends to obscure a valid estimate of the character of the protagonist, however, there is some compensating advantage in what they have to tell us of the author's personality. It is not exaggerating to say that Lizardi was more of a pamphleteer than a novelist, and that the creation of the *Periquillo* was due in part to the author's desire to avoid the effects of censorship. Writing in an era of revolution and social upheaval, it was natural for an intellectual of liberal tendencies to protest against the injustices of his time. The fact that Lizardi could not confine his feelings to the moralizing passages and that they spilled over to color the presentation of his principal character, should be interpreted as evidence of the extent to which the author was reflecting his personal reactions, perhaps his own experiences. As such, they must be judged as an indication of the warmth and sincerity of Lizardi's humanitarian sentiments.

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⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 108-109.

⁸ Jefferson Rea Spell, *The Life and Works of José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi* (Philadelphia, 1931), p. 87.

⁹ Fernández de Lizardi, *op. cit.*, III, 255.

Alphonse Karr or Victor Fournel? A Needed Clarification

In his *Salon de 1859* Baudelaire wrote, speaking of Delacroix:

... cet homme, ... ce génie a trouvé récemment un professeur pour lui enseigner son art, dans un jeune *chroniqueur* dont le sacerdoce s'était jusque-là borné à rendre compte de la robe de madame une telle au dernier bal de l'Hôtel de ville. Ah! les chevaux roses, ah! les paysans lilas, ah! les fumées rouges (quelle audace, une fumée rouge!), ont été traités d'une verte façon. L'oeuvre de Delacroix a été mis en poudre et jeté aux quatre vents du ciel. Ce genre d'articles, parlé d'ailleurs dans tous les salons bourgeois, commence invariablement par ces mots: 'Je dois dire que je n'ai pas la prétention d'être un connaisseur, les mystères de la peinture me sont lettre close, *mais cependant*, etc. . . .' (en ce cas, pourquoi en parler?) et finit généralement par une phrase pleine d'aigreur qui équivaut à un regard d'envie jeté sur les bienheureux qui comprennent l'incompréhensible.¹

In a footnote after *chroniqueur*, M. Crépet offers the following explanation: "Baudelaire l'a nommé dans son essai sur l'*Exposition universelle de 1855* (244): il s'agit d'Alphonse Karr." Turning obediently to p. 244, we find Baudelaire speak thus of Delacroix's *La Justice de Trajan*: "Ce tableau est celui qui fut *illustré* jadis par les petites plaisanteries de M. Karr, l'homme au bon sens de travers, sur le cheval rose; comme s'il n'existait pas des chevaux légèrement rosés, et comme si, en tout cas, le peintre n'avait pas le droit d'en faire."

When Baudelaire wrote these lines in 1855, his memory was absolutely correct. When *La Justice de Trajan* was exhibited for the first time, in Paris, at the annual Salon of 1840, Alphonse Karr, then thirty-two years old, wrote:

Je n'ai pu admirer avec tout le monde le tableau de M. Delacroix, la *Justice de Trajan*. Le tout ressemble à la procession du bœuf gras. Trajan a particulièrement un air de garçon boucher enluminé de rouge de brique. J'ai demandé quel mérite on trouvait à cela. On m'a répondu: 'la couleur.' Et j'ai demandé à tout le monde: qu'est-ce que la couleur? la couleur consiste-t-elle à faire un cheval blanc lie de vin? Cela paraît une misérable excuse pour un dessin aussi incorrect que celui de plusieurs figures du tableau de M. Delacroix.²

Also M. Crépet's footnote at the mention of M. Karr (p. 244) is

¹ Baudelaire, *Curiosités esthétiques* in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Jacques Crépet (Conard, 1923), p. 492.

² *Les Guêpes*, April 1840, p. 174.

correct. We read there: "Alphonse Karr (1808-1890), novelist, journalist and occasional art critic."

Let us now turn back to Baudelaire's words in 1859, nineteen years after Karr's critical remarks. Karr was then fifty-one years old, therefore not exactly a *young* journalist (see p. 432). Nor would it have been correct to say that Karr's career, first as a teacher, then as a novelist and journalist, and even politician, had been confined to "giving an account of the dress of Madame So-and-so." Finally, there was, to my knowledge, and in spite of long and careful search, no critical write-up by Karr of the pictures which Delacroix had exhibited at the Salon of 1859. Baudelaire, therefore, must have been thinking of someone else when he wrote: ". . . ce génie a trouvé récemment un professeur pour lui enseigner son art, dans un jeune *chroniqueur*. . . ."

His wrath, I feel certain, was directed towards François-Victor Fournel, born in 1829, whose journalistic career dated from 1854. On May 25, 1859, Fournel wrote a vehement diatribe against Delacroix in the *Correspondant*, which began thus: "Je suis fort embarrassé pour parler de l'exposition de M. Delacroix, car je confesse humblement tout d'abord n'avoir pas le sens de cette peinture, et ne rien comprendre aux admirations qui l'accueillent." Baudelaire paraphrased Fournel when he wrote: "Ce genre d'article . . . commence invariablement par ces mots: 'Je dois dire que je n'ai pas la prétention d'être un connaisseur, les mystères de la peinture me sont lettre close, mais cependant. . . .'" Here, undoubtedly, was the "young" journalist (thirty years old), whose duties had so far consisted chiefly of the type of society reporter that Baudelaire mentioned. Here also was the "master" whom Delacroix had "recently found," according to Baudelaire, since Fournel's article had appeared seventeen days only before Baudelaire's first article on the Salon of 1859.³ Taking Fournel (and not Karr) as his point of departure, Baudelaire then seemed to have remembered Karr's blasting remarks nineteen years before (just as he had remembered them in 1855 when writing about Delacroix's exhibits at the Universal Exposition), seeing in these two critics, Fournel and Karr, the epitome of stupidity and a fair sample of the kind of critics whose acrimonious remarks are like "a glance of envy directed towards those fortunate people who comprehend the incomprehensible." But the *chroniqueur*'s name on p. 492 of M.

³ "Lettres à M. le Directeur de la *Revue Française*, June 10, 1859.

Crépet's annotated edition of Baudelaire's *Curiosités esthétiques* should not read "Alphonse Karr," but "François-Victor Fournel."

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Poe, Leconte de Lisle, and Tzara's Formula for Poetry

One of the more memorable affectations of Dadaism was Tristan Tzara's formula for making a Dadaist poem. The recipe is found in Tzara's *Manifeste sur l'amour faible et l'amour amer*, which is said to have been read in Paris at the Galerie Povolozky on December 12, 1920.¹ It goes as follows:

Pour faire un poème dadaïste

Prenez un journal.

Prenez des ciseaux.

Choisissez dans ce journal un article ayant la longueur que vous comptez donner à votre poème.

Découpez l'article.

Découpez ensuite avec soin chacun des mots qui forment cet article et mettez-les dans un sac.

Agitez doucement.

Sortez ensuite chaque coupure l'une après l'autre dans l'ordre où elles ont quitté le sac.

Copiez consciencieusement.

Le poème vous ressemblera.

Et vous voilà un écrivain infiniment original et d'une sensibilité charmante encore qu'incomprise du vulgaire.²

Tzara may well have devised his own mock formula for literary creation. But there was available a similar suggestion made ironically by Leconte de Lisle and apparently obliquely inspired by Baudelaire. In a reply for Jules Huret's famous *Enquête* of 1891 (reprinted by Charpentier in 1913), Leconte de Lisle had observed concerning the writing of Symbolist and Decadent authors:

C'est prodigieux, une pareille aberration! Et cette langue! Tenez, prenez

¹ Tristan Tzara, *Sept manifestes dada*, éditions du diorama (Paris: Jean Budry et co, s. d. [1924]), p. 97.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

un chapeau, mettez-y des adverbess, des conjonctions, des prépositions, des substantifs, des adjectifs, tirez au hasard et écrivez: vous aurez du symbolisme, du décadentisme, de l'instrumentisme et de tous les galimatias qui en dérivent. Vous riez? Mais je vous assure que c'est sérieux; ce qu'ils font n'est pas autre chose. Ce sont les 'amateurs de délire' dont parle Baudelaire: lancez en l'air, disait-il, des caractères d'imprimerie, et cela retombera en vers sur le papier! Eh bien! les symbolistes ont cru Baudelaire, ah! ah! ce sont des amateurs de délire! ³

This suggests a rather unexpected link between the author of *Maya* and the creator of Dada; yet the notion of drawing syntax out of a hat was not new. In 1718, a century before the birth of Leconte de Lisle, in his *Réflexions sur la poésie française* le Père Du Cerceau had published the following passage on the word-order of Latin poetry:

... pourvu que tous les mots qui doivent entrer dans la composition d'une Phrase, s'y trouvent rassemblez, peu importe bien souvent dans quel ordre on les y place, et quel rang ils y tiennent. Tel qu'on met à la tête de la Période, figureroit souvent tout aussi bien, si on le renvoyoit à la queue, de sorte qu'en mettant confusement tous les termes d'une Phrase dans un chapeau, et les tirant au hazard l'un après l'autre, comme des Billets de Loterie, la construction s'en trouveroit toujours à peu de chose près, assez régulière.⁴

Although it may be that Tzara, however ironically, was in fact "the first person in literary history to make no pretense whatever of employing even the imagination in composition,"⁵ there is an amusing earlier fictional example of the practice in American literature in *The Literary Life of Thingum Bob, Esq.*, where Poe describes his hero's method of writing violent articles, against other authors, in the role of one Thomas Hawk, scalper and brow-beater for the *Lollipop*:

I found playing Thomas Hawk, indeed, a far less onerous occupation than poetizing; for I went upon *system* altogether, and thus it was easy to do the thing thoroughly and well. My practice was this. I bought auction copies (cheap) of "Lord Brougham's Speeches," "Cobbett's Complete Works," the "New Slang-Syllabus," the "Whole Art of Snubbing," "Prentice's Billingsgate" (folio edition,) and "Lewis G. Clarke on Tongue." These works I cut up thoroughly with a curry-comb, and then, throwing the shreds into a sieve,

³ Jules Huret, *Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire* (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1913), p. 279.

⁴ François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, *Dialogues sur l'éloquence en général. Avec les réflexions sur la poésie française par le P. Du Cerceau* (Amsterdam, 1718), pp. 137-138. Henri Bremond cites parts of this passage from p. 18 of the 1742 edition of Du Cerceau's work in his *Prière et poésie* (Paris: Grasset, 1926), p. 43, footnote 2.

⁵ Oscar Cargill, *Intellectual America: Ideas on the March* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 220.

sifted out carefully all that might be thought decent, (a mere trifle): reserving the hard phrases, which I threw into a large tin pepper-castor with longitudinal holes, so that an entire sentence could get through without material injury. The mixture was then ready for use. When called upon to play Thomas Hawk, I anointed a sheet of fools-cap with the white of a gander's egg; then, shredding the thing to be reviewed as I had previously shredded the books,—only with more care, so as to get every word separate—I threw the latter shreds in with the former, screwed on the lid of the castor, gave it a shake, and so dusted out the mixture upon the egg'd foolscap; where it stuck. The effect was beautiful to behold. It was captivating. Indeed the reviews I brought to pass by this simple expedient have never been approached, and were the wonder of the world.*

Poe's Thingum Bob, Esq. seems, indeed, to have been a Dadaist born before his time. Perhaps his pepper-castor deserves a place among the mysteries with Tristan Tzara's *sac*.

But what of Leconte de Lisle, and le Révérend Père Du Cerceau with his eighteenth-century chapeau full of Latin syntax? Undoubtedly, their names should have been added by Tzara and his followers, along with the names of Poe and Baudelaire, to the roster of the 391 other Presidents of Dada.

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REVIEWS

Jackson I. Cope, *Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist* (St. Louis: Washington Univ. Studies, 1956. 179 pp. \$3.75). AFTER the lapse of three centuries Joseph Glanvill can still arouse the interest and hold the attention of those who read his works. Necessarily the interest is historical in the main. Glanvill mirrors many of the intellectual concerns of his period; but the image is so lively and so clear because he wrote for the general reader, and wrote with energy and boldness coupled with a high degree of skill. The principles set forth in his *Essay concerning Preaching* are on the whole exemplified

* Edgar Allan Poe, "The Literary Life of Thingum Bob, Esq.," *The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, edited by James A. Harrison (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1902), VI, 21.

in the works of the preceding years. To the varied content of these works the best introduction is the collection of *Essays* (1676), which may be taken as Glanvill's mature judgment on the issues with which he has dealt—a compendious classic that deserves to be better known; and even if one went no farther one would have a fairly comprehensive grasp of Glanvill and his relation to his age. On the thought of the age, in its various aspects, a great deal of valuable work has been done in the past half century by such scholars as Cassirer, Lovejoy, Burt, Carré, Powicke, Bredvold, and Miss Nicolson; but till Dr. Cope's volume no full study of Glanvill has been attempted since Ferris Greenslet's admirable little book, published in 1900.

The time was ripe for a re-examination; and that is what Dr. Cope attempts. If the subtitle, *Anglican Apologist*, is intended to furnish a single unifying principle of explanation, it is too simple and in fact breaks down. Much in Glanvill bears no direct relation to specifically Anglican apologetics. He was, indeed, far too independent to be, like Stillingfleet, one of the great official apologists of the Restoration Church. He is typical, however, of much that is best in the Anglican tradition from Hooker (whose fate it was to become all things to all Anglicans) down to Temple and Inge. "Restoration Anglican" would have been a less embarrassing subtitle and have offered a better focal point.

Dr. Cope's first chapter, on "Glanvill and his Friends," illustrates his varied contacts with the intellectual life of his age. The second deals with him as "Anglican Apologist," the third with his "Anglicanism." These chapters would have profited by a fuller and firmer account of the long clash between Puritan and Anglican, from which at last sprang the reaction of Glanvill and the other Latitude Men, praised by Burnet; they would have profited yet more from a clearer sense of what is for us in North America so difficult fully to comprehend, the developing ethos of (as Arnold called it) that "most natural and national of institutions, the Church of England." One point on which Dr. Cope himself seems not altogether clear is the strong and recurring Anglican preference for comprehension and tolerance, rather than a toleration outside the fold of the Church, but perhaps the obscurity lies rather in his phrasing (see pp. 76, 79-80). It is a pity, too, that he did not choose to make more use of Glanvill's "Bensalem," the manuscript version of "Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy," extracts from which he had already edited (*Huntington Library Quarterly* 17 [1953], 269-86). In the next three chapters Anglican

apologetics recede into the background while Dr. Cope considers other interests. He devotes chapter 4 to "Glanvill, More and a Spirit World," having already recounted their eager quest for confirmation of such a world in the reports of ghosts and witches—the least creditable of their activities, but partly explicable by the fact, on which Dr. Cope places too little emphasis, that they were fighting on two fronts, against Puritan enthusiasm, but also against Hobbian materialism. Indeed Glanvill was fighting on more than two fronts, as chapter 5, "Nescience and Knowledge," serves to remind us; for it reverts to *The Vanity of Dogmatism*, where the principal object of attack is the still current Aristotelianism of the Schools, and draws on the *Scepsis Scientifica* and *Plus Ultra*, with their championship of the Royal Society. Glanvill's scepticism, as Dr. Cope emphasizes, is in large measure strategic, and is certainly not designed to extend to the fundamentals of religion and morals or to the certitude of reason. It is limited by a firm belief in innate principles possessed by the mind, prior to experience and essential to thought. In short, as chapter 6 asserts, Glanvill is a Platonist, as he understands Platonism; and on the Platonic tradition as it came down to him, this chapter, though based mainly on secondary sources, throws some welcome light. Finally, we are recalled to Glanvill the churchman, though hardly to apologetics, in chapter 7, "Anglicanism and Plain Prose." This sets Glanvill's *Essay concerning Preaching* against its background and in relation to his models, Puritan and Anglican (Baxter, Wilkins, South, and others) and discusses the evolution of his own prose style.

As even this bare commentary will have suggested, Dr. Cope's *Joseph Glanvill* is a work of learning which illuminates its subject at various points. But no one could call it a well-written book. We have already questioned the adequacy of the principle by which he seeks to impose a sort of unity upon it. We must now regretfully add that Dr. Cope's prose detracts from the effectiveness of his valuable study. He comments (p. 158) on Glanvill's "formidable Latinate vocabulary for abstract states and qualities." But Glanvill's prose flows on lucidly and without notable impediments. He was never guilty of such a sentence as, ". . . this distaste for empty verbalism predicated the growth of Puritan bellicosity out of Scholastic disputations, both of which robbed Man of the proper use of reason, his only instrument for recapturing rapport with the laws of the universe" (p. 147, italics mine). And this is not an isolated example. One of the most disconcerting features of Dr. Cope's style

is his addiction to metaphor, especially when he yields to it, as he frequently does, in the course of summarizing Glanvill's views, and leaves us to guess whether the image is Glanvill's or his own.

Dr. Cope's is a fuller treatment than Ferris Greenslet's: he has more material to handle; but in organization, style and readability it falls far below that pioneer effort. It is a distasteful duty for a reviewer to have to point this out, and a duty that one would have shirked if the defect had not been symptomatic of what has happened to literary studies on our continent. Too often we seem to have lost the virtue which older generations of scholars—Lounsbury, Kittredge, Lowes, Greenlaw, Lovejoy, Padelford, Osgood, Hanford, and a host of others beside Greenslet—securely possessed: the ability to write lucidly, in a style free from jargon and offering its own evidence that the writers have not been students of the world's best literature in vain. Sometimes now it is hard to distinguish our writing from that of the social scientists!

University of Toronto

A. S. P. WOODHOUSE

Curt A. Zimansky, ed., *The Critical Works of Thomas Rymer* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1956. li + 299 pp.). FOR more than a century Thomas Rymer has been a by-word for critical error and perverse lack of taste. Macaulay, delighting in a pointed phrase even though truth might be pricked by it, called him the worst critic who ever lived. And only a few years ago the latest historian of English criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries concluded that "in matter, as in manner, Rymer may be said to represent the nadir of criticism." Yet in his own time Rymer was certainly not held in such contempt. Though he covertly answered him in part, the greatest critic of the seventeenth century openly paid him homage and was clearly in sympathy with some of his tenets. Pope, like Dryden, questioned some of his conclusions, but at the same time spoke of him as "one of the best critics we ever had."

The decline in Rymer's reputation is largely the result of a changing esthetic, but one suspects it is due also in part to a lack of accurate information about him and his work. Until fifty years ago he could be read only in the original seventeenth-century texts. Then Spingarn reprinted the Preface to Rapin, about half of the *Tragedies of the Last*

Age, and two of the eight chapters of *A Short View of Tragedy*. Thus a portion of Rymer was again made available to the student of the seventeenth century. Now Mr. Zimansky gives us all of Rymer's critical essays, together with biographical, historical, and critical commentary, the whole being the result of years of thoughtful and meticulous scholarship. Rymer the critic is before us again to be judged by the whole of his work in the setting of the period which produced it.

Mr. Zimansky writes that today we are aware that Rymer was the "champion of neoclassical rationalistic criticism," but I suspect that he is being overly modest in suggesting that before his edition appeared all who should have been aware of the significance of Rymer were in fact aware of it. Now there can be no excuse for hyperbolical condemnation of him based on inadequate information. Indeed it may be expected that a careful reading of Mr. Zimansky's edition will temper the remarks of future historians, for in Rymer one is brought face to face with many of the tensions and ambiguities of English literary doctrine in the last fifty years of the seventeenth century. The concern for principles which had evolved in Italy, France, and England in the preceding century and a half is unmistakably clear in him, as is the patriotic desire that English letters be second to none: The poet must ever strive to produce the ideal and the philosophical, not the occasional and merely historical; yet at the same time he must get variety into this apparent uniformity. He must follow nature, and the surest way for him to do so is to observe the principles which Aristotle has set down plain and clear. But the seventeenth-century writer does not follow Aristotle because he was an ancient: "Nor would the *modern Poets* blindly resign to this practice of the *Ancients*, were not the Reasons convincing and clear as any demonstration in *Mathematicks*." (This analogy to the seventeenth-century Queen of the Sciences is obviously intended as a clincher.) English poets have erred by ignoring the laws of poetry, but for all that Englishmen are not inferior: "Many the greatest Wits of *France* have attempted the *Epick*, but their performance answer'd not expectation; our fragments are more worth than their finish'd pieces. And though, perhaps, want of encouragement has hinder'd our labours in the *Epic*, yet for the *Drama*, the World has nothing to be compared with us."

Of course such commonplaces of the age would never have caused Rymer to be singled out for opprobrium. It was when he wrote detailed analyses of Beaumont and Fletcher and of Shakespeare that he raised the hackles of his descendants. When he considered *The*

Maid's Tragedy and *Othello* "by the common sense of all ages" he outraged people in certain quarters, particularly the idolaters of Shakespeare. As Mr. Zimansky effectively points out, Rymer's common-sensical method was founded on the laws of probability. If a tragic character or episode or fable violates our reason, our sense of the probable, then it is unnatural and hence bad art. It is bad not only because it fails to convince us, but also—and far more important—because it cannot fulfill the main function of tragedy, which is instruction, according to Rymer. We have long since moved away from this conception of tragedy, yet there is a fascination in reading Rymer's inexorable laying bare of improbability in the plays he dissects. One may not agree with the implication of T. S. Eliot's observation ("I have never, by the way, seen a cogent refutation of Thomas Rymer's objections to *Othello*") but he is caught up in and amused by Rymer's bantering invective. Rymer may be wrong in his critiques but he is arresting in remarks such as this about *The Maid's Tragedy*: "Our Poet here gives to the great Comical Booby Callianax, the honour of a long name with a King at th' end on 't, yet lets the King himself go without. But since he must be nameless we may treat him with the greater freedom, and to tell my mind, certainly God never made a King with so little wit, nor the devil with so little grace, as is this King *Anonymus*." In such comments the pervasive raillery of the Restoration makes its way into literary criticism and adds a fillip to it. In short, because of his much deplored hectoring, Rymer is still readable.

Mr. Zimansky's edition is an excellent example of careful and illuminating editing. In his introduction and commentary he makes effective use of modern scholarship and adds to it the results of his own learned and far-seeking research. He presents Rymer in the complex of seventeenth-century thought and he tracks down the sources of his more esoteric comments. The result, as he points out, is that Rymer emerges as a much less learned man than his contemporaries thought him, particularly in regard to Provençal poetry. In an appendix he gives an annotated bibliography of Rymer's works, corrects errors of the past, and discusses works attributed to Rymer. In all this he is modest and convincing. His text is an old spelling one, carefully collated with multiple copies of the originals. Unfortunately the text has no line numbers and Mr. Zimansky rarely uses an identifying phrase in his commentary to guide the reader to the passage he is annotating. As a result the commentary is not as easy to use

as it might be. This is a minor matter, however, and can be ignored in view of the excellence of the edition.

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H. T. SWEDENBERG, JR.

Ralph M. Wardle, *Oliver Goldsmith* (Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1957. viii + 330 pp. \$5.00). SINCE Dobson's brief memoir in 1888, there has been no serious attempt to view Goldsmith anew, to judge his writings in the light of later critical techniques, or to incorporate in one biography the large mass of scholarly research that has accumulated. Mr. Wardle is to be congratulated and thanked for having made the attempt, and for having succeeded at least in the last of these aims.

Whatever scholarly diligence can do, Mr. Wardle has done. He has read, and used, everything that has been written on Goldsmith (including, as Mr. James Clifford has noted in the October, 1957, issue of the *Johnsonian News Letter*, the Campbell-Boyd-Percy memoir of Goldsmith at the British Museum); and he has corresponded with all the likely librarians and local historians. That little of significance has been uncovered is not Mr. Wardle's fault—there may be nothing new available. In this relatively short book he does not try to solve or expatiate on the biographical problems that have been plaguing scholars—when specifically Goldsmith was born, what exactly he did on his travels, which of the various anecdotes about the sale of the *Vicar of Wakefield* is true—but he does the next best thing: he lists all the conflicting articles in the notes, where a student can look further, and contents himself with a reasonable guess. In conscientiously performing his duties, Mr. Wardle usefully compares Marteilhe's *Mémoires d'un Protestant* and Formey's *Histoire Abrégée de la Philosophie* with Goldsmith's translations of these books and weighs the relative merits of Goldsmith's two-volume *Roman History* with his one-volume abridgment of it. All these are necessary tasks which will not need to be done again. Only once do I find Mr. Wardle's scholarship nodding: in 1772, he says, Johnson was jealous of Goldsmith because "He could hardly help realizing that his edition of Shakespeare, fine as it was, could not stand up against Goldsmith's recent achievements as poet, dramatist, and historian" (p. 228). Had Johnson really done no more by 1772?

In its criticism and interpretation the book is less authoritative than in its scholarship. The chief critical view advanced is that Goldsmith was a pre-romantic in an insufferably neo-classical age. Of Goldsmith's *Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning* (1759), Mr. Wardle writes that it

discloses . . . that he was a conscious artist, at odds with the spirit of his times, looking to life for inspiration rather than to books, impatient of rules established by misguided critics—an artist who wrote as he did on principle and whose theories anticipated in many details those of Wordsworth, Shelley, Lamb, Ruskin, and, in general spirit, the attitudes of the Romantic Revival with its stress on originality, interest in the common man, distrust of intellect, simplicity of expression, and the dignity and freedom of the individual—especially the individual artist (p. 98; see also pp. 202-4, on the *Deserted Village*, and the summation on p. 296).

Now, there is no question that Goldsmith did not write poetry like Addison's or theorize like Rhymer, but they were hardly "of his times"; and everyone would agree that he was, like his contemporaries Chatterton, Smart, Churchill, Boswell, Percy, and even Johnson and Gray, subject to a multitude of influences now seen to have portended the future. But can we really say that Goldsmith, who never seriously attempted a new verse form or even exploited the old ones widely, who damned Gray's adventurous odes for their obscurity, whose aim was to bring back the comedy of Queen Anne's time, who had a low opinion of the Elizabethans and a high one of the Augustans, whose poetic diction is, as Mr. Wardle notes, conventional, who paid Voltaire and the *Encyclopédie* the homage of frequent plagiarism, had much in common with Shelley and Ruskin?

Another weakness, perhaps unavoidable in any biography of Goldsmith, is the book's failure to establish an integrated view of Goldsmith's character and to relate it to his work. Mr. Wardle argues, for example, that Goldsmith's reputation for buffoonery was caused by an irreverent humor incomprehensible to the Johnsonian circle, and thus explains the success of such jests as the "Haunch of Venison" and "Mrs. Blaize"; but there is little here to connect this Goldsmith with the author of the more substantial pieces. Mr. Wardle rightly makes much of Goldsmith's insecurity and self-doubt, which he plausibly grounds in his homeliness, poverty, and foreignness, but he never shows how, or whether, this insecurity affected the writings. Again, he assumes that Goldsmith was at fault, from youth to maturity, in his differences with his family; but he does not try to resolve the

contradiction between such an assumption and our awareness that Goldsmith was, after all, unusually kind and unusually sensitive to the feelings of others. The view of Goldsmith's relations with his mother epitomizes the problem: "But although he might jest about her failure to write to him in later years and may even have worn only half-mourning at her death, explaining that it was for a 'distant relation,' he must have suffered, as any decent man would, at the thought of how deeply he had hurt her" (p. 44). That the estrangement might have been partly the mother's fault, at least in Goldsmith's mind, there is no hint here.

Seeing different fragments of Goldsmith in different situations also accounts for the weakness of the argument that his was a philosophy of "contented acceptance." Certainly this phrase characterizes most of the pieces here cited; but how then does one explain the melancholy of the two major poems, the occasional despairing letters of the *Citizen*, the subversive social theory of original parts of the *Animated Nature*, or the steady brooding over the danger of being good natured in a rapacious world?

Most of my complaints have been of Mr. Wardle's tendency to simplify and of his inability to present a unified view of either Goldsmith's life or his writings. But it must be added that no one else has recently so much as tried to resolve the dilemma of Goldsmith, and that no one at all has ever succeeded. One of the virtues of this work—and it is a considerable one—is that its deficiencies clearly direct the way for future criticism and biography. And, beyond all cavil, Mr. Wardle has provided for the Goldsmith scholar an indispensable ordering of the materials of Goldsmith biography as well as, in the notes, a remarkably complete list of writings on him.

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MORRIS GOLDEN

Mary Moorman, *William Wordsworth, A Biography: The Early Years, 1770-1803* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. xvi + 632 pp. \$8.00). IN this, the first of a projected two-volume account of the life and work of William Wordsworth, Mary Moorman, daughter of the eminent historian, G. M. Trevelyan, has written the most complete and the most readable description of the poet's first thirty-three years now in print. Having had access to sources of informa-

tion—particularly the Abinger Collection at the Duke University Library, the Pinney Papers at Racedown, and the Dove Cottage Papers in the Wordsworth Museum at Grasmere—either unavailable to or unexploited by earlier biographers, Mrs. Moorman devotes approximately one hundred pages more to the period 1770-1803 than did the late George McLean Harper, her only predecessor to attempt a full life. With the great de Selincourt-Darbishire editions of the letters, the journals, and the poetry constantly before her, and drawing upon virtually every known document pertaining to Wordsworth and his acquaintances in the years under discussion, Mrs. Moorman succeeds in reducing to a single, coherent narrative line a formidable multitude of facts. As a job of integration and synthesis her performance is brilliant. Because of its comprehensiveness and, so far as the mere life is concerned, its factual accuracy, this book will be a reference tool of considerable aid and convenience to all scholars dealing with Wordsworth's early years.

After remarking in her Preface that "Wordsworth has been unfortunate in his biographers" (p. vii) and then observing (p. viii) that Harper "added little to what was already known" (Harper of course added Annette and Caroline Vallon), it is only fair of Mrs. Moorman to confess that she herself has not discovered "many new facts about Wordsworth" (p. ix). In her Preface and in the notes to her text she graciously acknowledges that most of what is new in her book derives from the researches of other people. A Mrs. Heelis of Sawrey, for example, is responsible for the revelation that Ann Tyson's cottage, in which Wordsworth lived during term-time from 1779 to 1787, was situated not in the village of Hawkshead but in the hamlet of Colthouse, half a mile to the east. It was Mrs. Heelis, moreover, who unearthed Ann Tyson's ledger, a document that yields intimate details about the diet of the Wordsworth boys in their school-days (pp. 84, 30-31). The welcome fact that Wordsworth first met William Godwin on February 27, 1795, comes from the Godwin diary in the Abinger Collection, acquired some years ago by Newman Ivey White, and presently being edited by Professor Lewis Patton (pp. 262-63, x). The existence in this same collection of a letter written on July 31, 1797, to Godwin by Thomas Wedgwood, who therein expressed the desire for a "detailed statement of the first twenty years of the life of some extraordinary genius," was revealed in 1956 by Professor David V. Erdman, who believes that Wedgwood's desire may have encouraged Wordsworth to compose *The Prelude* (pp. 333-

36, x). Mrs. Moorman is overmodest about her own contributions to the story. Her investigation of the Dove Cottage Papers—unpublished and untapped miscellaneous documents, among them the family account sheets—provides us with the most detailed survey of Wordsworth's finances yet published (although Professor Wallace W. Douglas's discussion of the subject [*PMLA*, 1948] is more frank and objective), including the astonishing fact that the guardians kept niggardly track of the Wordsworth children's share of the laundry and billed them accordingly (113 n.). There is in addition, thanks to the author's indefatigable antiquarianism, valuable new information about the establishments at Racedown and Alfoxden where some of Wordsworth's best poems were conceived.

But if there is not a great deal here that is new and original about Wordsworth's life, about his work there is even less. The chief weakness of Mrs. Moorman's book is that it contains too little of what is old and well established concerning Wordsworth's intellectual and poetic development. This results apparently from a lack of interest in ideas and poetic techniques, and from that curious English tendency, remarkable even before the advent of John Foster Dulles, to suspect all things of foreign origin and to behave as though American scholarship, if ignored long enough, will somehow go away. Only thus can one explain the smug opinion that the French Annette Vallon could not possibly have made a satisfactory wife to any Englishman "as intent as Wordsworth on the things of the soul" (p. 182). And only thus can one attempt to explain how Mrs. Moorman found it possible to write a book of the scope and pretensions of this one without once referring to the relevant work of such scholars and critics as Joseph Warren Beach, Oscar James Campbell and Paul Mueschke, Hoxie N. Fairchild, James Venable Logan, Florence Marsh, Melvin Rader, and Jane Worthington Smyser.

This is not to say that Mrs. Moorman has neglected American commentators altogether. Twice she mentions the late Arthur M. Beatty: once to prove him and Harper obviously wrong in supposing that 1850 *Prelude*, II, 276-80, refers to Wordsworth's mother (p. 44 n.); the other to collapse his notion that the Lucy poems were addressed to Mary Hutchinson by putting the presumably devastating question, "If Lucy is Mary, why should she be dead?" (p. 424). Beatty, a pioneer in the history of ideas, is not remembered for such trivialities. In 1918 Beatty published an essay on Joseph Fawcett's *The Art of War* and its probable influence on Wordsworth's *Guilt and Sorrow*.

Mrs. Moorman reveals some knowledge of this influence (p. 295), but she evidently is innocent of the fact that Beatty was the first to point it out, for she does not refer to Beatty in this connection. In 1922 Beatty demonstrated the influence of David Hartley's associationistic psychology on Wordsworth's poetry. Mrs. Moorman ignores this influence, the reality and importance of which no responsible Wordsworthian has attempted to deny, and contents herself with a few offhand mentionings of Hartley's name (not all of which are listed in the index—see, for example, those on pp. 366, 367, 381, and 511; the index, what is more, sends us under "Hartley" to p. 385, where he is nowhere referred to or in any way involved), most of them suggesting that anyone like Hartley, with his mechanical system, could be only anathema to such as Wordsworth. Beatty made at least one other memorable discovery. Among the poet's letters is one he wrote to Francis Wrangham from Racedown. It is important because it helps to date the composition of *The Borderers*, which Wordsworth recollected having written in 1795-96. A number of editors and experts—Knight, Gordon Wordsworth, and de Selincourt among them—studied the letter and dated it variously 1795 and 1796. Late in the 1930's Beatty visited Dove Cottage, turned the manuscript letter over and discovered, of all things, the postmark: February 27, 1797. In his Errata and Addenda in the last volume of his edition of the letters, de Selincourt gave Beatty credit for his ingenuity. Mrs. Moorman writes: "This letter was written in Feb. 1797, as its postmark proves and not, as printed, in 1796" (p. 268 n). If one did not know better one might surmise that Mrs. Moorman, silent on a peak or near a lake in Westmorland, had been the first to see the postmark plain.

There are other mistakes in this book that involve not questions of scholarly taste and judgment but matters of fact. On page 126 Mrs. Moorman writes that Wordsworth "did not wish, to use the language of *An Evening Walk*, 'to delve in Mammon's joyless mine—'." There is no such mine in *An Evening Walk*; the reference is to *The Vale of Esthwaite* (PW, I, 283). On page 365 Mrs. Moorman says, "*The Recluse* continued to haunt about his mind for the rest of his life, but except for one book called *Home at Grasmere*, written in the early spring of 1800, he never wrote any more of it." The truth is—and Mrs. Moorman had it right earlier on the same page—that Wordsworth later wrote the bulk of *The Excursion* as the second book of the projected *Recluse*. On page 379 Mrs. Moorman describes "Expostulation and Reply" and "The Tables Turned" as the "last of the poems

to be written for *Lyrical Ballads*." The last of these poems was of course "Lines Composed . . . above Tintern Abbey . . . July 13, 1798." On page 417 Mrs. Moorman states that de Selincourt discovered MS. JJ "just in time for insertion as an appendix into his edition of the early text of *The Prelude* in 1926. . . ." The appended pages describing MS. JJ appeared first in a 1932 reprint of de Selincourt's second (1928) variorum edition of *The Prelude*. On page 482 Mrs. Moorman tells us that *The Recluse* [*Home at Grasmere*], having been published first in 1888 and again in 1889, "was never reprinted until 1949 in *P. W.*, v, where it appears as Appendix A, pp. 313-39." Andrew J. George reprinted it in 1904 in his Cambridge Edition of Wordsworth (pp. 222-32), published by Houghton Mifflin Co. On page 569, while discussing the political sonnets Wordsworth wrote in 1802, Mrs. Moorman remarks: "His habit of looking into the past is here applied not to his own life but, for the first time, to the history of his country." He had in fact done it before in 1793 when he wrote the original stanzas for what became *Guilt and Sorrow*, and he did it again at Windy Brow in 1794 when he was correcting and adding to *An Evening Walk* (see *PW*, I, 36). On page 484 Mrs. Moorman asserts that when Wordsworth wrote *Home at Grasmere* in 1800 "The word 'duty' had not yet entered his poetic vocabulary. . . ." It happens that Wordsworth used this word exactly six and a half lines above the passage Mrs. Moorman is discussing; Professor Lane Cooper's Concordance reveals that he had used it at least nine times before.

It is the nature rather than the number of these errors that is distressing. All of them, unfortunately, concern the poems, their composition, or their editing. Inevitably they call into question the intimacy of Mrs. Moorman's first-hand acquaintance with what on page vii she concedes to be the "chief justification for a biography"—Wordsworth's poetry.

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GEORGE W. MEYER

Edward Nehls, ed., *D. H. Lawrence: A Composite Biography, Vol. I: 1885-1919* (Madison, Wisconsin: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1957. xxvi + 614 pp. \$7.50). EDWARD Nehls' aim, in this fine synthetic biography, is to bring together the voluminous memoirs on

D. H. Lawrence, and to arrange them as lenses on the author's life. To this extent, his projected three-volume study is a product of the 1930's, when the great flood of Lawrence reminiscences all but swamped the author's reputation. Some twenty years later Mr. Nehls enjoys the advantage of perspective, of distance from his controversial subject, and of revived interest in the novels, stories, poems and travel books as works of art. With this advantage he avoids the chaos of the 'thirties, the messy haggling which effaced the work itself, and achieves instead a careful and judicious selection from a wealth of sources. Of course, we have already had two balanced, comprehensive biographies from the able Harry Moore, to whom Nehls owes much of his material. The unique achievement here, the quality which only *this* biography sustains, is immediacy, or direct perception of the artist through shifting points of view.

For continuity and control, Nehls turns to the Lawrence letters and to portions of his autobiography. Within these markers he arranges brief memoirs and fragments from the longer recollections, all chosen for their relevance and authority. Thus Jessie Chambers Wood dominates the "lad-and-girl" period in Lawrence's youth; Helen Corke, the teaching years at Croydon; Frieda Lawrence Ravagli, the elopement to Germany; David Garnett, the hike through the Tyrol; or John Middleton Murry, the *Blutbruderschaft* phase in Cornwall. These commentators are reinforced, in turn, by other members of the Lawrence circle, and by a group of new contributors—Lawrence's childhood friends, several models for his characters, Frieda's children by Ernest Weekley, and Lawrence's students, both private and public—whose reminiscences add much to the book's freshness. In addition, there are various documents and sketches, always keyed to specific situations: the debates in Parliament on the suppression of *The Rainbow*; a BBC interview of farm neighbors in Cornwall; a glimpse of Lawrence from a Compton Mackenzie novel; and two fragments, hitherto unpublished, of a projected Lawrence novel on Robert Burns.

Logically, a book so varied should prove uneven in quality, and there are indeed lapses when the life grows crowded and indeterminate, as in the Croydon chapter. But Lawrence's life has seldom lacked for excitement, or for friends to record it in language quickened by his memory. Even the hurt, bitter "friends" are eloquent in their comments. One of the great advantages of Nehls' method is that it brings together their confessions in dramatic context: Jessie Chambers Wood, complaining blindly that Lawrence has ignored her years of

pure, joyful devotion to his genius, in his portrait of Miriam Leivers; Bertrand Russell, driven by Lawrence to self-depreciation and thoughts of suicide, then rejecting his ideas completely; Philip Heseltine, moved by "a deep spiritual wound which never healed," in his denunciations of his erstwhile hero; and puzzled, self-conscious Murry, aware only, in the Cornwall period, "that one of the deepest and most mysterious problems of life was in question then: that on my side I fought and suffered blindly, while Lawrence on his fought and suffered with more understanding." These are all wounded figures, touched at the very core of being, unable to recover except by retreat or recrimination; they are not the casual victims of an absurd adolescent, who heaps abuse on unyielding objects. As Lawrence's wife asserts, in her foreword, he wanted to meet these friends "on a deeper, more human level and not the conventionally accepted one . . . he felt their potentiality in its entirety and he wanted them to be what they might and could be"; but they resented this demand or failed to understand it. This is the larger truth about Lawrence which emerges, without editorial bias, from the quarrels in this volume.

Not all the friendships proved disastrous. Eleanor Farjeon writes that Lawrence stimulated her "to see my own troubles and problems without the falsification of self-pity or grievance." Or Lady Cynthia Asquith cites his gaiety, his capacity for sheer fun, the contagious quality of his enjoyment, of his aliveness. This Pan-like Lawrence is also dramatized in context, through frequent descriptions of picnics, conversations, walks through the woods, charades and songs at parties, and domestic tasks made creative by his immense vitality. "How dull it was when he had gone," adds one admirer, after a fine account of such activities, including some amusing (and horrific) bouts with Frieda. Still another writes of her sudden discomfiture, during a stay with the Lawrences, when advised to be true to her own feelings: "The Lawrences slept in a bedroom across the hall from mine, and truth to my feelings at the time would have made me suggest that Frieda and I should change places." Apparently this gay, delightful Lawrence could also touch the core of his contemporaries.

But essentially his gift for life was thwarted during the period covered by this volume. Over half the book is devoted to the war years, 1914-1919, when the Lawrences were cooped up in England and forced to endure poverty, ill health, dissolving friendships, police persecution (as potential German spies), censorship of the novels, and the depressing weight of war itself. This is the same experience which

Lawrence records in *Kangaroo*, in the brilliant nightmare chapter. The decadent, drifting England of *Women in Love* is also present, and the desire to escape it, so as to form a small colony of friends in Florida, seems less preposterous here than at face value. At the end of this volume, when Lawrence prepares to leave for Italy, alone and hostile, we are almost forced to share his feelings. Such close identification with a state of mind is rarely achieved in biography, perhaps only when the biographer himself becomes a novelist—in this case, by employing the old epistolary form, in fusion with the multiple perspectives of modern fiction. Certainly Nehls reveals an artist's grasp of growth and change, conflict and communion, in his selection of material. If his second and third volumes match the first, he will have produced the most uniquely dramatic work in modern biography, and by the same token, the most deeply informative work on Lawrence. I must add, more prosaically, that Volume I contains bibliographies of Lawrence's works and of the memoirs, a biographical glossary of the Lawrence circle, a section of notes and sources, and an index. Some previous knowledge of Lawrence seems helpful, however, in following the text.

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MARK SPILKA

Peter Rickard, *Britain in medieval French Literature: 1100-1500* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956. ix + 282 pp. \$6.50). MR.

Rickard's *Britain in medieval French Literature*, the outgrowth of a recent Oxford doctoral dissertation, is a competent and useful survey of an attractive area in literary history. Given the comparative lack of previous research on its subject, this book concentrates necessarily on factual compilation, and critical appraisals are secondary. Fortunately, except in the bibliography and in the first chapter (on historical background), "thesis scaffolding" is virtually non-existent.

In orderly fashion, Mr. Rickard gives accountings for typical allusions in *chansons de geste*, the *matière de Bretagne*, "great" Englishmen in French texts, continental notions and clichés concerning the several peoples of pre-United-Kingdom days.

The "great" Englishmen, in French eyes, would be Thomas Becket, Richard I, William Marshal (regent, 1216-1219), Edward III, the Black Prince, Richard II. While quibbles about their relative im-

portance would only waste time, it should be remembered that royalty alone made any widespread impression in French literature. Except for the accident of single texts, Becket and William Marshal might not have gained so much as a mention in Mr. Rickard's study. English scholars in mediaeval Paris receive only passing mention (p. 29), presumably because they lacked literary glamor. Bede and William of Malmesbury are little more than an after-thought in the final chapter. Mr. Rickard does not speculate on sundry other figures, such as Henry V, who surely made some impact on French consciousness. Perhaps no answer is possible, but one wonders why French writers paid scant attention to, for instance, Henry II, Chaucer, Robert Bruce. Thanks perhaps partly to Charlemagne, Alfred the Great seems never to have captured the continental imagination: still, Mr. Rickard might have mentioned him as a source for the thirteenth-century *Empereurs de Rome* by Calendre.

Among mediaeval epithets discussed by Mr. Rickard are the familiar *Anglais coué* and the less common *Anglais qui couve*. Two pages (165-166) on this subject summarize his informative article in *French Studies*, VII (1953), 48-55. Mr. Rickard is rather too severe about an earlier note by Artur Långfors in the *Mélanges Hoepffner* (Paris, 1949), pp. 89-94. True, the eminent Finnish scholar was less affirmative about the origins of *coué* and *couver* as applied to the English; also, Mr. Rickard adds further corroborative examples from mediaeval texts. But Professor Långfors did not feel obliged to spell out the evident palaeographical similarity between the two verbs.

It is in the two chapters on the *matière de Bretagne* that Mr. Rickard is at his judicious best. For this reason he will no doubt incur the displeasure of extremists at Celticist and anti-Celticist poles alike. To his credit is the fact that his approach to Celtic ingredients does not confuse origins and mediaeval adaptations. His principal comments will bear excerpting, even where they are hardly new: "The rise of chivalry and *courtoisie* owed nothing to Celtic legends of Arthur. . . . Whether or not we accept the Modena sculpture [on the archivolt of the Porta della Pescheria] as valid evidence [i.e., predating Geoffrey of Monmouth], we cannot ignore the possibility of a widespread oral tradition, both before and after Geoffrey. . . . Geoffrey's literary sources were multiple, while he himself speaks of the popularity of legends of Arthur. . . . R. S. Loomis has said, 'Geoffrey of Monmouth launched his book on the flowing tide of Arthur's prestige.' . . . 'It responded to a kind of antiquarian ex-

pectancy' [T. D. Kendrick]. . . . The Arthur of French romance is much nearer to Geoffrey's Arthur than to the Arthur of Welsh tradition. . . . The contribution of Geoffrey and Wace amounted to a loose framework upon which were woven tales of Celtic origin, spread and sometimes invented by the Bretons, and occasionally invented upon Breton models by the French. . . . The Tristan legend contains much that is obviously not in the French tradition, and is demonstrably Celtic. . . . It is highly probable that Béroul or his immediate source was speaking from first-hand experience, and had actually visited Cornwall. . . . Foerster and W. A. Nitze contest the view that Chrétien [de Troyes] ever came to England. Bruce considered that nothing has yet been proved. This is of course true: one can speak only of probabilities here" (pp. 71-113).

However interesting, is it necessary even to ponder the problem of a Chrétien journey to England? The knowledge indicated in his poems (cf. Rickard, p. 112) could perfectly well have reached him at second-hand, and notably the "picture" of London in *Perceval* 5754-5782. Incidentally, this description is less than "striking" (Rickard, p. 109), because, as he himself says on the next page, "much of this might apply equally well to any big city in France or England."

Once in a while the reader might wish for positive comment, where Mr. Rickard carefully hesitates, perhaps too wisely. For instance, he notes (p. 102) that U. T. Holmes identifies Camelot with Colchester (Camulodunum) in Essex, whereas W. A. Nitze and T. A. Jenkins would place it near Montgomery by the Camlet River, or else near the Cam in Somerset. Mr. Rickard takes no position, even though the lack of testimony for Arthurian tradition in Essex is a factor which can be invoked against Holmes only *ex silentio*.

If a guess is permissible on the basis of Mr. Rickard's discussion (cf. also p. 236, note 1), it is that he would share the view of the distinguished Celtic scholar, Kenneth Jackson: "J'ai souvent pensé, en lisant les ouvrages de certains arthurisants traitant de choses celtiques, que s'il me fallait mettre un point rouge dans la marge chaque fois que l'auteur commet une erreur grave, une 'fâcheuse bévue,' en fait de philologie ou d'histoire celtiques, le livre aurait l'air d'avoir la scarlatine" (from a paper read in 1954 at the Grail symposium in Strasbourg).

Mr. Rickard's bibliography, while detailed and adequate, invites minor comment. Publications by Bédier and Foerster are listed only as of early editions. Dates of publication are occasionally missing.

The Waters Brendan, Jullian's *Eveil de la sculpture italienne*, and the *Anglais qui couve* by Långfors deserve more than footnote reference. Similarly, the Hilka and Roach editions of Chrétien's *Perceval*. And, throughout the book, the Grail legend is safely by-passed.

The notes and queries suggested here must not be construed as strictures either sought or scored against Mr. Rickard. His book is a richly positive contribution to the mediaeval French story, factual in the record which it establishes, and prudent in the judgments which it formulates.

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EDWARD B. HAM

Elias L. Rivers, *Francisco de Aldana, el divino capitán* (Badajoz: Institución de Servicios Culturales, 1955. 208 pp.). IF the first part of this *vida y obras* is more attractive than the second, it is not the fault of this excellent study but of the extraordinary life of Aldana, a life stemming from a noble Spanish family tradition (*un fondo de guerra y santidad*) and including such scenes and players as Florence and the Medici, the Duke of Alba, Flanders, Requeséns, Arias Montano, Philip II, Sebastian of Portugal and, through him, death at Alcazarquivir. Sometimes the personalities and the milieu carry along the biography; Aldana's intellectual formation is revealed through a brief account of Varchi and contemporary Florence (humanism, neoplatonism, pagan sensuality), yet the documentary link with Varchi is simply an exchange of sonnets.

Though Professor Rivers is careful to distinguish history and poetry, he does employ Aldana's verse (and his brother Cosme's) for biographical purposes, an effective means of giving new flesh and spirit to the man, for, in his verse, the reader can find Aldana the lover, the avid or disillusioned soldier, can sense his charm, dignity and anguish. Usually it was possible to date the material before building on it but, on one occasion, no dates are offered for three beautiful sonnets from which a spiritual development is deduced and, once this is done, the sonnets are interpreted in the light of that spiritual development, a somewhat circular method of argument (pp. 71-74). Nonetheless, the presentation of this emotional and spiritual development is so reasonable one cannot resist being convinced despite the method of reasoning.

In the absence of a complete chronology of the poetry, the study

is organized on the basis of genres, but an evolution of the poetry is suggested, following the phrases of the life: the influence of pagan sensuality, neoplatonism, etc., in the Italy of his youth, the enthusiasm for war and empire, disillusionment and, finally, contemplation.

The sonnets and the epistles contain the best of Aldana and some of the truly good poetry in Spanish. The study divides the sonnets into three groups: occasional, amorous and spiritual. In the second, whose originality he stresses, Professor Rivers analyzes one of Aldana's most original and poetically forceful sonnets, noting the directness of language ("en lucha de amor juntos travados / con lengua, brazos, pies"), the neoplatonism differing from his contemporaries', and the form—a Platonic dialogue with two quartets of question and two tercets of answer. Of the beautifully precise simile in the answer, Professor Rivers says, "Este símil intelectual, parecido a una analogía platónica, es la clave del soneto" (p. 157). This is true and essential, but it is also a plastic and sensual image, for water penetrating a sponge not only conversely resembles the frustrated effort of the soul to penetrate the beloved's but recalls the striving for physical penetration as already indicated, together with lines 5-6, "el vital aliento ambos tomando / en nuestros labios, de chupar cansados." *Chupar* is the action of the sponge also. The poem contains another original feature which surprises a reader expecting the vine and elm cliché after *qual vid*; instead, the lovers are "enredados / qual vid que entre el jazmín se va enredando." The repetition of the verb and the use of the progressive add to the sensuality of the lines.

The analysis of the poetry is at all times sensitive and intelligent though occasionally directed toward the formal structure, leaving other aspects relatively untouched. It points out the failure of a sonnet (to Cosme) to exploit the possibilities of the sonnet form; composed of nine comparisons beginning with *qual* in ll. 1-13, it is resolved in l. 14 starting with *tal* (p. 153). His criticism is valid but, in addition, it might have been pointed out that the poem contains two arresting images. After seven commonplaces, we find "o qual quedó tras el diluvio el suelo; / tal quedé yo sin vos, hermano amado." In the second comparison, Aldana avoids another cliché; instead of the bird midst the foliage weeping the loss of its family, the center of the pathos is "la planta umbrosa / biuda del ruyseñor." Concerning "Marte en aspecto de Cáncer," the remarks are "Es pictórico el primer cuarteto" and "Cada uno de los cuartetos y tercetos encierra justamente una sola fase distinta del movimiento" (pp. 154-155).

This is a little neater than necessary for, not until Venus "un beso . . . / *fixó en la frente y dél todo colgava*," in ll. 7-8 are their attitudes and positions established; here is the part of the poem which is most "pictórico."

This ability to create graphic images or to externalize his thought with concrete similes is the mark of the best of Aldana's verse. The study notes this in several instances, singling these lines from a spiritual sonnet: "*anda qual velocíssimo correo / por dentro el alma el suelto pensamiento*" (pp. 160-161). Among the spiritual sonnets is one on the anguish of war ("*Otro aquí no se ve . . .*") and another ("*Al rey . . .*") of imperial aspiration with a religious cast; Philip is the Messiah and Juan de Austria, John the Baptist! The more purely religious sonnets are less pleasing; the effective lines are diluted by a *conceptista* tendency which is intrusive rather than creative.

Professor Rivers straightens the record in regard to the number of epistles and the tradition from which they stem—one being Ovidian and influenced by Boscán, and the other five principally in the vein of Horace and Garcilaso. Attention is properly concentrated on the "Carta para Arias Montano . . ." The analysis of this poem, "*en este género, la obra maestra de Aldana*" (p. 174), indicates its intimate and sincere tone, the formal distribution of the material, the stylistic effect of verb usage, etc., and, especially, the originality and beauty of Aldana's exposition of *la vida retirada*, the contemplative process, and the mystic search for union (in Aldana's case apparently never achieved). This is the first epistle in which the moralizing function of the Horatian type was imbued with Christian thought, thereby fusing "*el humanismo . . . y el cristianismo de aquella época ferviente*" (p. 178).

Of the other verse forms, the *canciones* and *versos de arte menor* are of little interest and the study passes over them quickly. The free translation of Alamanni's free translation of lines from Ovid has some good verses, particularly those on nymphs playing in the water. The remarks on the evolution of these lines almost synthesize Aldana's style: "*Habiendo deshecho Aldana la concentración puramente verbal, nos ha acercado más a la realidad física del mundo humano*" (p. 183). There remain the *octavas*, of which the most interesting is the fragment on the "Juizio Final," whose grisly realism reminds Professor Rivers of the sixteenth-century polychromed statuary in Valladolid, though perhaps it might more appropriately be related to the realistic aspects of late Gothic art in general.

The chapter frankly states that the *octavas*, which constitute more than half the bulk of the poetry, do not appeal to modern taste. Typically, the critic's assessment is unwarped by a proprietary interest in the subject, nor is praise lacking where due. "La poesía . . . como su vida, es variadísima. Nos interesa por su honda humanidad, sobre todo, pero, también, a veces, por su arte consumado" (p. 190).

The book is beautifully written and organized. Some of the material serves in the biography and then in the study of the poetry, yet there is no burdensome repetition, as the biographical and literary functions are kept distinct. Though, in the *vida*, it is Aldana's personality and, in the *obras*, his style that interests the author, there is no neglect of purely historical details. He fixes Italy, and probably Naples, as the place of birth and the date as 1537, a clever deduction from four verses couched in terms of Ptolemaic astronomy. Professor Rivers avoids the term "sources" but they are occasionally offered; for example, Lucretius and León Hebreo for the physical details and the neoplatonic theory of the love sonnet discussed above. Much new historical material was discovered by the author, and it is a pleasure to note how scrupulously he acknowledges and how carefully he assesses the work of others.

It is probably unfair to notice an oversight in a book which has had so much to say, but it is a little surprising to find nothing on Aldana's syntax, in which he is even more venturesome than, for instance, Herrera, whose syntax has been much discussed. Consider these two examples of hyperbaton: "el agua, . . . / Hinchíó toda del suelo alta abertura"¹ and "En esto el fiero sale entendimiento."² These are not only important for Aldana's style but also for the history of Spanish style.

The apparatus includes a select bibliography and a good chapter on previous editions and criticism. It would be helpful to have an index of proper names and of lines discussed in order to find quickly all the comments, biographical and critical, on each poem. Physically the book is pleasant enough, though the errata are more numerous than necessary and should be eliminated in the second printing, for it is incredible that a book of this caliber should not be reprinted.

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¹ *Obras completas de Francisco de Aldana*, ed. M. Moragón Maestre, Madrid, 1953, vol. I, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

Maurice Regard, *L'Adversaire des romantiques: Gustave Planche* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1955. Vol. I: 454 pp. Vol. II: 317 pp.). ONE of the great difficulties in assessing French romanticism has been a lack of perspective on how it fitted into the society of the time. A great deal has been written about the major figures of the movement, substantially less about the *minores*, and practically nothing about the opposition, then powerful but now almost forgotten.

M. Regard has undertaken to fill a gap in our knowledge of the period with a full biography of Gustave Planche, once Sainte-Beuve's rival for honors as France's leading critic, and a tart commentator on the weaknesses and foibles of the romantic school. To this he has added a second volume, containing Planche's known correspondence together with all available replies, a bibliography of the critic's articles with a short commentary on their contents, an iconography, and a detailed index. In short, he has treated Planche as though he were a member of the Cénacle instead of a writer whom literary historians have chosen to ignore.

To do so, he had to start from scratch. Before this biography only two long studies of Planche had been made, one by Wolfgang Balzer in 1908, the other by Sister Bras in 1937. Neither of these, however, attempted a complete treatment. To make matters worse, Planche had become a strange legendary figure, called Gustave the Cruel, whose reputation was covered with mud thrown principally by Sainte-Beuve and Hugo. To separate fact from malicious gossip, to reconstitute the man as he probably was, M. Regard had to burrow through archives, unearth correspondence, and handle contemporary opinion gingerly, separating the grain of truth from the chaff of embittered comment.

Following the classic French pattern for a biography, the author outlines Planche's bourgeois ancestry, then follows him chronologically through a career more interesting for what the critic wrote than for what he did. In almost too great detail, each article Planche wrote is analysed, his friendship discussed, and there are lengthy quotes from Planche's impressively large number of bitter and vocal enemies.

Certainly Gustave Planche was a difficult figure to resuscitate. Son of a pharmacist, raised in an atmosphere that Mérimée would have understood, he abandoned the bourgeois world for that of Bohemia. All through a sad and pathetic life, he seemed born for unhappiness. His bumbling attempts at love affairs with George Sand and Marie Dorval made all Paris laugh. Poverty haunted him and he turned into

a ragged, unwashed, unkempt figure who found solace from the irony of his destiny in heavy drinking.

Nonetheless, he rose above his lot. Of all the critics of the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, only he earned the honor of being called incorruptible. He had early formulated a "system" of criticism that permitted full scope to his analytical mind: I. understand a work; II. explain it; and III. give advice to the writer. Planche dreamed of becoming another Boileau, though he also tried his "system" on the fine arts and music. He served, he believed, "la critique indépendante," as honestly as he could. If he saw faults, he bluntly pointed them out in his dry style. As a consequence, he earned a reputation as the Executioner and infuriated a host of distinguished men that included almost all the romanticists, as well as colleagues like Karr, Pontmartin, Nettement, Cuvillier-Fleury, and Janin. Jealous, perhaps, of greater talents than his own, he delighted in exposing the weaknesses of the romantic drama or the carelessness of Lamartine's poetry. As a regular contributor to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, he became notorious for trenchant articles like *La Haine littéraire* or *Les Royautés littéraires*. Planche preferred the past to the present, logic to emotion; he seems to have had no feeling for the problems of the writer of his day and the solutions attempted. Mercilessly he attacked what he considered sham and sentimentality, reaping a plentiful harvest of hate.

M. Regard has written a necessary book, sometimes too full of detail, sometimes dull, but one that will help us fix romanticism in its proper perspective, a contribution to *L'Envers du romantisme*.

Syracuse University

ALBERT J. GEORGE

Maurice Lecuyer, *Balzac et Rabelais* (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1956. 222 pp. *Etudes françaises fondées sur l'initiative de la société des professeurs de français à l'étranger*, 47). PROFESSOR Lecuyer presents in this study the results of his efforts to treat more systematically and more completely than heretofore the relationship between Balzac and Rabelais. That there are common factors is beyond dispute, and much of Lecuyer's material is sound and familiar. There are words both Balzac and Rabelais like, character-types which appeal to both, obsessions both share: all are catalogued here.

Sometimes, however, it is hard to come to grips with Professor Lecuyer, to descend from metaphor to fact and know for certain where he stands. When he finds (p. 15) that Balzac and Rabelais are "frères spirituels," there can be little disagreement, but when he finds a "parenté spirituelle" between the eleventh, the sixteenth, and the nineteenth centuries (p. 19), his statement is less than clearly meaningful. And it is difficult to know what to make of the assertion that Rabelais shows in his work "une certaine chasteté si l'on donne à ce mot un sens symbolique d'ordre supérieure" (p. 30). Two pages later Balzac, too, is chaste, because he tells dirty stories: "C'est en fait une marque d'idéalisme que de cacher ainsi derrière quelque récit paillard les replis les plus intimes de son coeur." Again, Bianchon derives from Rabelais because he has "un esprit libre," a "bonté foncière," and he is "assez sceptique à l'égard des femmes et se commet peu avec elles" (pp. 155-156). But another character is Rabelaisian because he has "une faiblesse pour les jeunes demoiselles" (p. 157). On pp. 108 ff., all of Balzac's scepticism seems to come from Rabelais and on p. 112 "une foi totale" is also the mark of Rabelais, and Balzac gets that from him, too.

M. Lecuyer states that he will not exaggerate the importance of geographical factors (p. 76) and then finds (p. 79) that the comic gift of both men comes from Touraine. But on p. 152 Balzac uses comic comparisons because Rabelais does, and is more influenced by Rabelais than by any other factor (p. 142). In fact Lecuyer even finds that the "anatomies" Rabelais did at Lyon are a prefiguration of Balzac "ouvrant le coeur de celle-ci, disséquant les lobes frontaux de celui-là . . ." (p. 77).

I do not know how to argue for (or against) a sentence reading "Inutile de dire que Panurge, Sancho Pança et Figaro sont des frères quasi jumeaux, Sganarelle aussi . . ." (p. 144). If it means anything, then it destroys the thesis of this book, for Lecuyer has usually demonstrated only a family resemblance between Balzac and Rabelais, if I may continue his metaphor. If in reality his is a use of metaphor in order to avoid stating the relationship more precisely, then he has perhaps missed an opportunity to explore one of the real points in this study.

I cannot agree with Lecuyer that the *Contes drolatiques* are superior to the rest of the *Comédie humaine* (p. 19). I am puzzled when he writes that "C'est surtout en donnant à ses héros des proportions gigantesques que Balzac se rapproche de Rabelais" (p. 198). Yet his

elucidation two pages later does not help me: "Est-ce à dire que Rabelais est à l'origine de cette vision des choses chez Balzac? Nous ne le croyons pas, mais nous pensons que l'un admire l'autre et emploie les mêmes procédés parce qu'ils font partie tous deux de la grande famille des poètes." Nor can I join him when he finds any significance at all in the fact that Rabelais starts publishing in 1532 and dies in 1553 (sic), while Balzac publishes his *Physiologie du mariage* in 1829 and dies in 1850, in both cases a span of twenty-one years.

I do share with Lecuyer a distaste for the pedantic and halting style of much scholarly writing; to this extent I applaud his efforts to break from it. But let the reader judge one of the results: "En l'an XII de la République (1804) à Caen chez Le Roy paraît la huitième édition du *Nouveau dictionnaire historique* en treize volumes de L. M. Chaudon et F. A. Delandine. Ouvrons le dixième tome à la page 323. L'article *Rabelais* se présente à nos yeux. Il se termine à la page 326" (p. 56). It is possible to prefer a footnote.

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B. F. BART

Lowell Dunham, *Rómulo Gallegos, vida y obra*, tr. Gonzalo Barrios and Ricardo Montilla (Mexico City: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957. 327 pp. Colección Studium, 15. \$3.85). LA primera biografía nutrida y científica sobre el célebre escritor venezolano se ha escrito por un norteamericano; y aparece, antes de haberse publicado en inglés, en la traducción española, hecha según el manuscrito, por los señores Barrios y Montilla, íntimos amigos y compañeros políticos de Gallegos. Prescindiendo de unos pocos anglicismos, por lo visto involuntarios ("un viajero" (p. 13): se trata de una mujer! (*ingl.*: "a traveller")), me parece muy bien lograda la traducción, en cuanto se puede juzgar sin haber visto el original.

La obra se divide fácilmente en dos partes (aunque no indicadas), terminándose la primera, sobre la vida y el desarrollo espiritual del héroe, con el cap. IV, pág. 164, comprendiendo la segunda, que trata de las obras novelísticas, los cap. V-IX. En la pág. 301 comienza una bibliografía de 27 páginas en tipo chico, y que contiene hasta el más mínimo artículo de periódico que se haya publicado sobre el escritor ya hecho un clásico, hasta 1956; amén de indicaciones detalladísimas sobre sus propios escritos. Con tan meritorias cualidades bibliográficas,

y considerándose la presentación envidiablemente esmerada del volumen, extraña la falta del índice alfabético de nombres, casi indispensable; y cierta dificultad técnica de encontrar cada vez las notas a que se refieren los lugares del texto, y vice-versa.

La "parte I" se puede llamar obra maestra, y no tan sólo respecto de la rica y exacta documentación, la autenticidad del material, la manera de relatar viva y hasta entusiasta, y con ello sobria e imparcial. Más bien, el autor demuestra, al hablar del ambiente nacional y local de su escritor, sus condiciones de evolución, y la trágica existencia de una población tropical e hispanoamericana, una penetración y una fineza poco menos que estupendas en un hombre de extracción otra que neolatina; tanto más como que él, mientras es amigo personal de Gallegos, nunca ha pisado suelo venezolano. Quien, como el que firma estos renglones, ha presenciado en persona los años del gobierno semi-dictatorial de López Contreras y la pseudo-democracia de Medina Angarita, las esperanzas temblorosas de que, con Gallegos y Betancourt, llegaría por fin la anhelada democracia, y el rápido derrumbe de tal esperanza apenas realizada, puede volver a vivir todo esto como en una novela, al leer los cap. I-III de Dunham ("La tierra, la gente y la época"; "Gallegos, el escritor"; "Gallegos, el líder político"). Se desenreda el desarrollo aparentemente complicado del escritor; y con acierto, el autor ha ejemplificado dicho desarrollo, demostrando, en su cap. IV ("Los ensayos"), cómo, desde la primera juventud, Gallegos ha tratado, en su actividad de escritor, los asuntos que habían determinado su propio carácter; escribiendo, en revistas de aquella época, sobre educación, cuestión social, libertad pública, etc. (Es así como Gallegos, prodigio entre los jóvenes intelectuales hispano-americanos, nunca ha compuesto el obligatorio "libro de poemas.") Mientras que tal actividad ensayística del joven Gallegos no era desconocida ya antes de Dunham, es él, sin embargo, quien ha despejado el camino para su lectura coherente, habiendo publicado, años antes, un volumen titulado *Una posición en la vida* (México, 1954), y en donde se encuentran todos los ensayos, las arengas políticas y no políticas, etc., reunidas y a la mano, que hasta la fecha debían buscarse en revistas y periódicos en parte poco menos que inaccesibles, y que Dunham ha logrado sacar con artimañas de las garras del déspota, mientras tanto derrumbado. Casi el único rasgo esencial en el carácter de su héroe que el Sr. Dunham ha dejado de señalar, es su sangre mezclada: hecho sin el cual no se sentirá la vibración íntima de un libro como *Pobre negro*.

El autor no se muestra menos preocupado que el mismo Gallegos de las lacras hereditarias—no hablándose por el momento de las exquisitas gracias—de una nación como la venezolana; sus “complejos de inferioridad”; sus “frustraciones” y su falta de responsabilidad pública; su abominable ingratitud poco menos que perversa para con quienes se sacrificaron por ellos, y entre los cuales Bolívar y Gallegos no son sino dos ejemplos descollantes. No sin tino hace derivarse, de tal índole colectiva, al menos en parte, el “fracaso” (en lugar del éxito) que sigue acompañando los esfuerzos de la nación, y cuyo símbolo es el caudillazgo cada vez renovado, en lugar de la libertad democrática anhelada (p. 12 s., 79, 107 ss., 120 ss., 127 s., 139, 153 s., 161, 166 ss., 281, 295 s.). Y no contento con tal sinceridad generosa frente a un pueblo que no es el suyo, el autor no ha vacilado en dar su parte de la responsabilidad en tal miseria interminable hasta hoy día, a su propia nación, los Estados Unidos de América—aunque quizás no precisamente el gobierno—(v. especialmente p. 120 ss.; cp. también p. 152 s., 227). Da prueba con ello el señor Dunham no tan sólo de su perspicacia política y psicológica, sino de una honestidad y un “coraje cívico” nada comunes.

Ya habían desfilado, en el cap. II, las obras poéticas de Gallegos, cuentos, novelas cortas, novelas, hasta dramas, acompañando los momentos de la biografía que a cada una entre ellas corresponden. No habría sido imposible alargar tales menciones pasajeras con el valioso material documental reunido por el autor, y que él ha preferido reservar para una “segunda parte”: un tratamiento “analítico” de los cuentos y las novelas, desde *La rebelión* hasta *Una brizna de paja en el viento* (cap. V-IX). El que firma confiesa con franqueza que, a su parecer, en esta “segunda parte” no rige un método de crítica literaria adecuado al histórico tan distinguido de la “primera.” Por lo menos es así desde el punto de vista de la estética estilística y formal que considero la única apta para comprender obras de arte; no negando, sin embargo, que tal método puede parecer unilateral a otros. En cada caso, huelga decir que no hace falta información preciosa tampoco en esta “parte segunda” del libro de Dunham: sobre las fuentes literarias de Gallegos, los ambientes geográficos, históricos, psicológicos que le han inspirado, los modelos para sus personajes—en fin, sobre todo lo que es materia y preparación en una obra de arte. Pero en donde comienza, a mi opinar, la provincia del arte mismo es en donde parece pararse el interés de Dunham. La composición como forma de la invención, las situaciones y los caracteres creados, la

fantasía, la expresión, las metáforas, las imágenes, las varias "formas de elocución" y su papel en la evocación de vidas y encuentros: en una palabra, el "cómo" de la presentación, el "estilo"—es aquí en donde se da el paso misterioso que distingue el arte—evocación de lo "posible"—de la historia—presentación de lo "real"; y es aquí en donde se calla la voz de nuestro crítico. Es verdad que el Sr. Dunham ha consagrado toda una sección de su último capítulo al "simbolismo" de Gallegos, llamándolo uno de los "patrones" de su arte (p. 291 ss.); pero el simbolismo de que habla es de carácter matemático—él mismo lo dice (p. 291 s.); no tiene que ver con el símbolo poético, tema que el que firma ha tratado en muchos lugares de su libro *Rómulo Gallegos. Estudio sobre el arte de novelar* (México, 1954), permitiéndose de referirse a ellos. Del estilo, o sea la expresión del poeta frente a la realidad que ha concebido, no se habla en el libro de Dunham sino desde un solo punto de vista, el más obvio, o sea, el cambio de estilo que ha conducido a Gallegos desde la descripción hacia la sugestión, o sea, desde la novela clásica y realista hasta la "novela-película" (hago uso de mi propia terminología). Y dicho cambio se trata tan sólo desde un aspecto por demás positivista y pragmático, alegándose que al lector "moderno" no le alcance el tiempo (!) para leer descripciones detalladas, etc. (p. 283). El autor se remite a Gallegos en persona para autorizar esta "interpretación" (p. 287, n. 68), la cual—venga de quien quiera—no debería, a mi parecer, figurar en un ambiente de análisis de arte. El señor Dunham hace una buena pregunta: "¿Qué factores se combinaron para hacer de *Doña Bárbara* una obra maestra . . . ?" (p. 231). Pero contesta con los conceptos siguientes: "*Doña Bárbara* es una obra maestra . . . por su bien desarrollada intriga; por la poderosa . . . presentación literaria de una región . . . con su particular psicología; por su veracidad histórica y por el lugar que ocupa en la tradición literaria . . . de Venezuela" (p. 234). Entre estos cuatro puntos:—(1) es aplicable también a cada novela policíaca; (4) pertenece a la historia de la literatura y no a la obra poética; (2) y (3) corresponden también a cada buen ensayo geográfico, histórico y etnológico sobre Venezuela. Ni uno solo de los cuatro conceptos toca el arte como tal, aunque lo acompañe. El proceso arcano y sublime que cambia, por medio de la persona del poeta, la realidad de la vida en algo que, sin dejar de ser vida, es superior a la vida, se debe buscar con otros medios y en otras regiones espirituales.

En suma, tenemos un libro que, en cuanto ideológico, psicológico y

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biográfico, merece calificarse de excelente; y que le proporciona material importante y rico al que quiera acometer la dura tarea de la interpretación artística en el sentido auténtico de la palabra. Y vayan al señor Dunham las felicitaciones más sinceras y bien merecidas por el esfuerzo tan honesto como logrado con el cual nos ha presentado la personalidad de Rómulo Gallegos, hombre y escritor.

University of Toronto

ULRICH LEO

Gustavo Correa, *La poesía mítica de Federico García Lorca* (Eugene: Univ. of Oregon, 1957. v + 174 pp. Univ. of Oregon Monographs, Studies in Philology, 7). THIS study of the poetry of García Lorca consists of a brief introduction, six chapters and the conclusion. The six chapters are devoted to the study of six works of the poet of Granada: *Poema del Cante Jondo*, *Romancero Gitano*, *Bodas de Sangre*, *Yerma*, *Llanto por Ignacio Sánchez Mejías*, and *Poeta en Nueva York*.

In the introduction the author states that his intention is to make a structural analysis of a part of Lorca's poetry and to determine its sources ("fijar . . . el impulso primario que sirve de cauce a la inspiración del poeta"). This "primary impulse" as we shall see is *the myth*, crystallized within the "mythical conscience," as defined by the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer.

Correa in his first chapter gathers from *Poema del Cante Jondo* images reproducing the keynote of tension felt by the man threatened by death. Although we find no direct reference to the myth, it is clear that Correa understands as such any image related to this feeling of tension. In somewhat confused fashion Correa accumulates numerous images of various types: emblems, like those of colors ('lo morado' on page 8, and 'lo negro' on page 17), symbols ('cielo hundido' and 'las nubes' on page 17) or simple metaphors ('estremecidas estrellas de los velones' and 'el ojo doliente del candil,' both on page 15, and 'las espadas de los dedos' on page 18). In some instances the only selective criterion seems to be the use of a certain word in Lorca's poetry, even if the word lacks significance-value, as in some quotations involving the 'tower' on p. 16.

Much more interesting is the second chapter, devoted to the study of *Romancero Gitano*. There is no doubt that it was this work, together with the two tragedies (*Bodas de Sangre* and *Yerma*), which

started the author on his "quest for myths." Here we have some of the best parts of the entire book; Correa gives us impressive samples of his skillful interpretation. To read the pages containing the study of *Romance de la luna, luna*, with its analysis of the progressive series ('si vinieran—cuando vengan—que ya siento,' page 24), the study of the moonlight (page 25), or the account of the rhythmical structure of the poem (page 26), is to realize how valuable the book might have been, had the author limited himself to the "structural analysis" of Lorca's poetry. Unfortunately, passages like these are not frequent, since Correa loses himself in catalogued enumeration of terms and images touched with a supposed mythical significance.

We have to question, however, the author's right to consider as mythical some of Lorca's references to the moon, the fish or any other thing, where their relation to reality is based on a simple metaphoric comparison. If we accept as generally true Correa's statement that the moon in the poetry of García Lorca is associated to "un auténtico sentido trágico" (p. 49), and that "la presencia sinistra de la luna en toda la poesía de Lorca tiende a establecer una relación de causalidad mítica entre la muerte del hombre y el astro de la noche" (p. 159), we are forced to reject such illustrations, as: 'Su luna de pergamino / Preciosa tocando viene,' or the description which Correa gives of the gypsy Anunciación in the ballad *San Gabriel*: "Ella se encuentra en su casa en actitud propicia y expectante bajo el signo mítico de la luna: 'bien lunada y mal vestida' (p. 39)."

Similar generalizations occur with other concepts. According to Correa the fish represents a purely sensual attraction and amorous passion (p. 169). The most outstanding examples that he quotes are the ballads *La casada infiel* (studied on pp. 34-35), *Muerte de Antoñito el Camborio* (p. 41), and *San Rafael* (p. 38). Should we now read these poems, we shall see that the reference to fishes in *La casada infiel* ('Sus muslos se me escapaban / como peces sorprendidos') and in *Muerte de Antoñito el Camborio* ('En la lucha daba saltos / jabinados de delfín') are purely metaphorical, i. e. they purpose describing the "slippery" agility of the body. In the third poem, the ballad *San Rafael*, Lorca refers to the biblical triangle: Saint Raphael—Tobias—fish, and at the same time describes metaphorically the statue of Saint Raphael reflected in the water (Lorca utilizes here the same technique as in his New York poem *Niña ahogada en el pozo*, in which the stars reflected in the water acquire properties typical of the surrounding element: 'Y croaban las estrellas tiernas').

In general, the study of *Romancero Gitano* leaves the impression that the consideration of the myth, revealing and useful at times, engages the author's attention too much and carries him into excessive generalizations, discovery of non-existing meanings, and a disappointing abandonment of the interpretative analysis.

The following chapters, which deal with dramatic works and with the poem *Llanto por Ignacio Sánchez Mejías*, present further samples of the author's skill in stylistic studies, especially when he is unmindful of his mythical obsession. We could adduce several passages in which Correa analyzes with great security and clarity the rhythmic and structural patterns of Lorca's work. Among others, parts like the study of the "Estructura de las canciones líricas" in the third chapter, the annotations about the rhythmic structure of the four parts in *Llanto*, or the observations on the refrain: 'A las cinco de la tarde' ("hay un movimiento contrario de máxima reducción en el tiempo y máxima extensión en el espacio," p. 104) belong to finer pages of contemporary criticism.

It is a pity that these valuable passages of Correa's study are shadowed by the rest of the book, which reduces itself frequently to a simple enumeration of the concepts related (and not always) to the myth.

The sixth chapter deals with the book *Poeta en Nueva York*. Correa sees in it the anti-mythical poetry of Federico García Lorca. In a series of subdivisions the author gathers symbols according to the themes to which they refer. Thus we have another copious anthology of Lorca's symbols; but as elsewhere there is hardly an attempt made to analyze, to explain, or to evaluate them.

Placing Correa's book against the background of various writings on the myth in literature, from those of the Cambridge Hellenists to the most recent speculative theories of Richard Volney Chase, we realize that Correa accepts generously the definitions of all "mythologists" and, further, he generalizes them to the extent that everything which is natural, vital, and emotional is equivalent to mythical, while everything rational and logical is condemned as anti-mythical. This generalization, thus, leads at the same time to the establishment of a radical dualism which is hardly new. Wallace W. Douglas, in his article "The meanings of 'myth' in modern criticism" (*MP*, I, 1953) describes this tendency: "They [mythologists] talk as if the mind had two functions or faculties, the speculative reason and the mythopoeic imagination, which correspond to the 'world' of fact and the 'world' of non-fact . . ." (p. 242).

The conclusion in Correa's book is most disappointing. Prepared by Correa himself to find in this part the "explicación final," and therefore a certain aesthetic evaluation of the myth in García Lorca, the reader finds that the poet of Granada is being completely forgotten. Instead, Correa virtually floods the pages with quotations from Ernst Cassirer, L. Lévy-Bruhl and many other "mythologists," as if he wanted to justify himself and to strengthen his statements with the prestige of those writers.

It would be proper here to remind Correa of the theories of Leslie A. Fiedler, who distinguishes between Archetype (or myth, according to Correa) and Signature: "I use Signature to mean the sum-total of individuating factors in a work, the sign of Persona or Personality, through which an Archetype is rendered, and which itself tends to become a subject as well as a means of the poem. Literature, properly speaking, can be said to come into existence at the moment a Signature is imposed upon the Archetype. The purely archetypal, without signature-elements, is the myth." ("Archetype and Signature," *The Sewanee Review*, LX, Spring 1952, p. 262).

We are not going to discuss whether Fiedler's terminology is acceptable or not. The essential thing for us is to see that the myth by itself does not constitute a poem and, therefore, its aesthetic value is nil and its study useless for literary purposes. It is only through aesthetic vestures of poetic creation that the myth begins to emerge as important in a literary study. Correa, as a rule, disregards the artistic aspect (Signature) of Lorca's poetry and thus remains outside of a true literary analysis. We could again quote Wallace W. Douglas who, upon judging the work of the "mythologists," writes: "... the result has been to turn attention away from literature as literature and to import into criticism confusing terms and concepts drawn from a social science" (*op. cit.*, p. 242).

We also would have to object to Correa's constant going back to the "mythical conscience" of the primitive man, as the source of the artistic expression of everything vital and emotional. When he speaks of "la no diferenciación entre vida y muerte," as being an aspect of the unitary concept of life within the mythical conscience, characteristic of the primitive man of all latitudes, we ask ourselves whether in the case of Lorca, the stoic tradition and the contempt of death, typical of *Spanish* spiritual and historical life, was not much more responsible for this non-differentiation. And I do not refer just to "el niño que camina con la luna de la mano después de muerto" in

the ballad of *Romance de la luna, luna*, since this seems to be nothing but a figure of ballet, but rather to the spirit of Lorca's entire work, so candidly expressed in the ballad *Reyerta*:

Señores guardias civiles,
aquí pasó lo de siempre.
Han muerto cuatro romanos
y cinco cartagineses.

It would be unfair and indeed wrong to try to replace these factors, which derive from the national and regional Spanish life, by vague and confusing considerations of the mythical conscience and ritualistic creeds of the primitive man. Correa fails to see the real sources of Lorca's poetry: Spanish spiritual heritage and Andalusian folklore, and instead he lets himself be carried away by theories supported on the fragile base of the subconscious impulses of the primitive man.

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MICHAEL J. FLYS

Bernard Gicovate, *Julio Herrera y Reissig and the Symbolists* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. vi + 106 pp. \$2.00). IN this very thought-provoking study of Herrera y Reissig, one of the most obscure poets in contemporary Spanish American literature, Gicovate presents a tight running commentary on the movements and personalities which helped to shape Herrera's expression, and then, in considerable detail, he analyzes the different works of this author. Gicovate has obviously immersed himself in the atmosphere of symbolism for so long a time that occasionally he forgets his readers are not quite so well baptized, and as a result, may not always be able to follow the rapid turns of his analytical pen. In a word, this is a study for the experts rather than for the general student of literature who has only a tangential interest in the poetry of Herrera y Reissig. Personally, I regret this extreme conciseness in Gicovate's approach (much of it no doubt due to editorial cutting—ah, those editors who must keep the pages down!), for otherwise Gicovate, with his flair for analysis and his gift of style might well have produced a monumental work on a very little understood, but really first-rate poet. To be specific, he might have come out with something analogous to Amado Alonso's fascinating work *Poesía y estilo de Pablo Neruda* (Buenos Aires, 1940). One of the very few flaws in Gicovate's study (and

there are not many) is that he seems to have profited little from Alonso's studies. Neither the above-mentioned book, nor the provocative *Materia y forma en poesía* are mentioned in Gicovate's bibliography. Also omitted are the names of Arthur Symons, a noteworthy interpreter of Symbolism, of Max Henríquez Ureña, whose recent *Modernismo* is outstanding, and of Carlos Bousoño.

On the other hand, Gicovate does well enough without these aids. He has a keen mind and an excellent literary background for this kind of analysis. He shows the influence of Poe, Baudelaire, Verlaine, Mallarmé, Samain and others on Herrera, and traces many of these influences in detail, comparing lines. Item: Baudelaire's ennui, his sense of guilt, his obsession with drugs, his cats, his Oriental and African exoticism, his Satanism, his cemeteries, and his passing from immediate sensuous reality to an evocation of distant worlds, all of these aspects have their counterparts in the poetry of Herrera.

When Gicovate gets down to Herrera's own imagery, he has only enough space to hit the high spots. "Through images which in themselves carry no meaning, the Symbolist poet suggests his emotional state and conveys his understanding of nature. . . . Herrera's poems present an animistic nature, personified in vivid pictures. Even abstract qualities acquire movement and life:

La inocencia del día se lava en la fontana.

"The visual-kinetic image in this line does not reproduce the world as it is believed to be, but creates a hypothetical existence, independent of, and only subtly related to, a possible dawn. The reality thus transposed exists only in itself, and is subject only to forces and laws within a magnetic field of its own:

*Y hacia la aurora sesgan agudas golondrinas
como flechas perdidas de la noche en derrota."*

The poet gives a mythical interpretation of reality, Gicovate says, and the reader is left to fend for himself. "One of the peculiar characteristics of Symbolist poetry is this absolute disregard for the language of the tribe and for the public function of art. The Symbolist poet lives in fear of being understood. He is concerned with the personal, the exquisite, and the different; he shuns the facile accomplishment of communal language."

I do not believe that any poet lives in fear of being understood, nor do I believe that obscure poetry should merely obscure. This is seldom,

if ever, its intent. Poetry which is hard to follow falls into one of two categories: (a) it may be *difficult*, like that of Góngora, or (b) it may be *obscure* like that of Herrera y Reissig, Lugones, and Neruda. Difficult poetry follows a definite pattern in which allusions and images stand for specific items. It can be deciphered once the reader knows the code. Obscure poetry, on the other hand, must be approached through the senses and the emotions, and a re-creation of feeling, rather than a study of allusions, is prerequisite to a good understanding. Images take the place of drugs and heighten perception to a point far beyond that of normal human functions. Every image is an intuitive cry with which the poet makes his bid to capture the perishable moment imperishably. Unless the reader is able to force himself equally, he is impotent.

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JOHN A. CROW

Richard Brinkmann, *Wirklichkeit und Illusion. Studien über Gehalt und Grenzen des Begriffs Realismus für die erzählende Dichtung des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957. xi + 347 pp.).

WHEN we use a collective term such as "realism" to refer to the literature written in Germany between 1830 and 1890 we should be able to presuppose certain well-defined characteristics which are common to the movement as a whole as well as to its individual manifestations, for the function of general concepts is both to serve as common denominators and to clarify distinctions between special classes and categories. Even after a half century of critical discussion of the problem, however, it is still manifestly impossible for us to use the term in this broader sense. If earlier critics have failed to shed much light on the problem of realism it is because they have made the mistake, Professor Brinkmann believes, of considering literature almost exclusively from the point of view of its empirical content only. The purpose of his study is thus both to point out the inadequacies of earlier critical views and to suggest a new approach which he believes will open the way to an understanding of the real implications of the movement.

Critics hitherto, he finds, have followed two main lines of attack. Beginning with Julian Schmidt most of them have attempted to evaluate realistic literature almost exclusively in terms of its objective

reality and to discuss realistic techniques in terms of the means writers have employed to represent this reality. Adolf Stern, Richard Meyer, Oskar Walzel, Hans Kindermann, Max Nussberger and countless others belong in this group. The studies of Georg Lukács on the German realists in the nineteenth century might be called the arch representative of this approach today. Style, form and aesthetic considerations interest Lukács only secondarily. For him the writings of the nineteenth century realists are worthy of our concern only insofar as they may be shown to mark stages on the way towards the proletarian revolution.

The other approach to the problem was initiated by Clemens Lugowski who took as his point of departure the poetic work itself, considering it apart from all political or historical implications as represented reality. The most celebrated work in this category is Auerbach's *Mimesis*. In his nineteenth chapter (p. 488) Auerbach makes it quite clear that he is not interested in defining the term "realism," and that his work is not to be considered an attempt at a history of realism. Nevertheless he uses the words "realism" and "realistic" quite frequently, particularly in the later chapters where, as Brinkmann points out, they come to mean essentially what they do for Lukács, the reflection in literature of economic and political relationships.

In pursuit of his own thesis, that we can clear up the confusion surrounding the term "realism" only by closely examining the structural reality of so-called *realistic* works, Brinkmann offers interpretations of Grillparzer's *Der arme Spielmann*, Otto Ludwig's *Zwischen Himmel und Erde* and Eduard von Keyserling's *Beate und Mareile*. He has chosen these works not as ideal examples of narrative writing during the age of realism, but as typical examples of the peculiar structural problems which the realists confronted. In his attempt to illuminate the structural reality of each his procedure, unlike Auerbach's method of commenting in detail on selected passages, is to discuss the works in their entirety and in the greatest possible detail, stressing particularly the opening pages since these reveal even at the outset the structural problems which the writer must contend with throughout the work.

Looking at the problem of realism as the problem of the objectification of reality in art, Brinkmann begins with two main questions: 1) of what nature is the reality which must be reflected in a work of art in order that we may call it "realistic," and 2) must this reality

be objectively represented as something independent of the recording subject and uncolored by his ideas and attitudes? In answering these questions Brinkmann investigates thoroughly not only the structural problems confronted by the realists, but also the profound changes which occurred in their relationship to reality as the century advanced. As his objective norm here he chooses Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften* which he finds truly objective in the sense that its style is never influenced by the feelings, needs, or attitudes of the characters, and that in like manner everything individual in it, all subjective self-willing on the part of the characters is integrated in an orderly fashion into a higher law, into an all-encompassing higher reality which is the ideal frame of reference within which the work is conceived. In Grillparzer, Brinkmann points out, we sense still as in Goethe's novel the glimmering of a higher, all-encompassing historical empirical moral world in which the individual is placed. In Ludwig's novel on the other hand the world has already become simply an "Umwelt," the environment as defined by sociology and natural science; the ideal reality which for Goethe had been the ultimate reality, and which Grillparzer had still shown as the inner possession of his *Spielmann* exists in *Zwischen Himmel und Erde* only as goodness and kindness in an individual psychological sense. In Keyserling's work even the postulate of an ideal nexus has become nil; reality exists only as experienced by the individual, and moral values too become subjectified.

Goethe's belief in the existence of an ideal totality enabled him to see the particular as a representative of the general. The realists on the other hand found it increasingly difficult to share this belief, and their progressive withdrawal from it perforce affected their outlook on reality. Their outlook was also profoundly affected by the increasing pressures of actual reality. Their social consciousness caused them to become more and more absorbed by the problems of human beings as particular individuals. We sense this change in emphasis in their increasing tendency to present characters in their own empirical reality. Bent as they were on showing this reality as it actually was, they set as their goal maximum objectivity. Paradoxically, however, their chief means of creating the desired impression of objective reality was, as Brinkmann shows, by a process of subjective empathy, a process which inevitably led them to a result which was just the opposite of the desired one. The harder they strove to capture the particular, the individual and the actual, the more subjectively colored both their works and their characters became.

Fully as interesting as Brinkmann's approach and his method is his interesting interpretation of the works of Grillparzer, Ludwig and Keyserling as expressions of the existential experience of individuals. By illuminating them from this point of view he helps us to see them not only as interesting realities in their own right, but also as important connecting links in the development from nineteenth century realism to the depth psychology of our own age. We are thus led to the fascinating conclusion that the striving of the realists to show the peculiar reality of each individual has made them in the truest sense the forerunners of the writers of today whose aim is essentially an extension of theirs,—that of showing the human being on his way to his own reality.

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WILLIAM H. McCLAIN

Réponse à M. Leo Spitzer: sur la méthode stylistique

Dans son compte rendu de mon livre sur le *Style des Pléiades de Gobineau, essai d'application d'une méthode stylistique* (MLN, LXXIII [Jan. 1958], 68-74), M. Spitzer donne libre-cours à une critique agressive dont le ton n'est pas sans rappeler l'irascible Scaliger. J'avoue, d'ailleurs, sentir quelque orgueil à voir l'illustre maître juger nécessaire une si longue réfutation de mon modeste essai. Malheureusement l'ardeur combattive de M. Spitzer l'entraîne même à des inexactitudes et à des contre-vérités que me voici forcé de relever.

J'ai tenté d'élaborer, pour l'analyse critique de l'œuvre littéraire, une méthode *stylistique objective*. Examinons ces deux adjectifs. Puisqu'il s'agit de stylistique, j'ai évité de définir les faits de style à l'aide des catégories grammaticales. Sans doute le style est-il un emploi particulier de la langue; mais une description grammaticale englobera indistinctement ce qui, dans une œuvre, a été employé sans intention littéraire, pour les besoins de la communication simple (ce que l'auteur a en commun avec les autres usagers de la langue), et ce qui est procédé expressif (et que l'auteur emploie de manière caractéristique, personnelle); bref, la grammaire décrit aussi le style, mais sans le distinguer du contexte linguistique. Comme la grammaire,

la rhétorique devait être exclue: originellement conçue comme un code du beau langage, elle introduirait dans la description du style un élément normatif; elle nous exposerait à méjuger un auteur en fonction de lois qu'il a pu ne pas connaître ou reconnaître; l'apprécier dans le cadre d'une doctrine revient à le trahir si son originalité a été de se révolter contre cette doctrine. Ces précautions n'empêchent pas M. Spitzer de dire qu' "une partie notable" de la grammaire et de la rhétorique a contaminé mon analyse (p. 71). Or je n'emploie la terminologie linguistique que pour désigner le matériau (la langue) avec lequel le style est construit; nulle part, je ne confonds le matériau, le bien de tous, et l'architecture, le propre de l'auteur; quand je parle d'un fait de langue, je ne lui attribue pas une valeur stylistique intrinsèque et permanente: je m'occupe uniquement de son *emploi* comme fait de style dans un contexte donné. De même, je n'use de termes rhétoriques que pour éviter de répéter les définitions qu'ils résument; nulle part, je ne confonds ces vocables techniques et l'évaluation esthétique qu'y attache Quintilien . . . ou Lanson.¹

Ce sont ces jugements de valeur prématurés que l'*objectivité* stylistique évite. Être *objectif* en ce domaine, c'est être libéré de tout impressionnisme. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'impressionnisme dans la description du style—le recours à des images qui n'expliquent rien (*style lourd, brillant, rapide*, etc.). Il s'agit d'abord de l'impressionnisme qui consiste à assumer qu'on sait où est le style, à appeler style le procédé qui nous donne l'impression, l'intuition qu'il y a quelque chose de voulu par l'auteur et d'efficace à ce point particulier. Il saute aux yeux qu'un tel critère d'identification dépend de l'époque, de l'intelligence, des habitudes de pensée, du degré d'attention du lecteur. Autant de raisons subjectives d'erreur, soit par omission, soit parce que l'auteur écrivait en fonction d'une culture autre, pour des lecteurs différents. Il y a plus grave: toute vérification du jugement ainsi préconçu tendra à ne retenir que les faits qui semblent se prêter à cette interprétation, à négliger les autres comme purs faits de langue; et cette déviation sera d'autant plus forte que l'observateur est d'un tempérament plus entier. C'est précisément le cas de M. Spitzer: sa vigueur d'esprit et sa culture ne le prémunissent pas toujours contre la tentation de plier les faits à ses systèmes favoris (par exemple, la théorie du baroque).

¹ On ne peut "supposer une structure valable stylistiquement dans tous les cas où elle répond au signalement du catalogue" (*Style*, p. 18 et n. 49). M. Spitzer fait la confusion, et se garde de me citer là où ma méthode élimine cette confusion.

Le concept du *lecteur moyen* m'a paru éviter ces dangers. Il n'y a pas de fumée sans feu : corrects ou non, les jugements de valeur d'un lecteur sont causés par quelque chose qui dans le texte l'accroche ; ils peuvent bien correspondre à des systèmes qui n'existent que dans son esprit, mais le fait qui déclenche la réaction est là. Or les stylisticiens ont jusqu'ici substitué leur jugement de valeur à sa cause : ils ont échafaudé des commentaires pour rationaliser leur réaction subjective à celle-ci. De plus, M. Spitzer, raisonnant sur ses réactions mêmes, au lieu de raisonner sur leur cause, aggrave son subjectivisme, en ne retenant que la réaction qui "lui semble" éveiller en lui la résonance la plus profonde (*click*). Il y ajoute cet apriorisme, que le *click* doit correspondre à une essence unique de l'auteur, laquelle expliquera tout harmonieusement—et il ne lui reste plus qu'à organiser ses autres observations (non pas même les faits observés, mais ses intuitions à leur propos) selon cette harmonie préétablie.² Tout au contraire, négligeant le contenu subjectif de ce que sent mon lecteur, je ne retiens de ses réactions premières ou secondes (rationalisation) que leur *valeur de signal*. J'enregistre les feux de ces fumées, les points où j'aurais envie de me laisser aller à des hypothèses, et j'attends pour construire que tous les signaux assemblés m'enferment dans leur réseau, ne laissant plus à l'imagination cette liberté que permet le fait isolé, liberté dont préférences personnelles et talent pourraient abuser.³ Alors l'auteur ne sera plus réduit à une essence hypothétique : la pluralité des faits relevés⁴ correspondra à la complexité, aux contradictions de l'âme humaine. Naturellement, avant d'en arriver là, il faut vérifier si les points qui ont provoqué les réactions sont bien des faits de style, non des faits de langue mal compris parce que d'une époque différente. Cette vérification consiste à trouver, entre les procédés, des convergences telles qu'elles ne peuvent être de hasard ; les relevés de Bally et de l'école française sont alors utilisables pour identifier ces procédés.

Ici M. Spitzer affecte de ne pas comprendre pourquoi je concilie sa

² "The *Zirkelschluss* in the 'divination' of the psychology of authors" (*Linguistics and Literary History*, p. 33).

³ M. Spitzer s'efforce bien d'englober tous les faits, mais ce n'est qu'après les avoir orientés et *préjugés* "by the anticipation . . . of the whole" (*ibid.*, p. 19). Il n'y a pas vraiment allées-et-venues "from details to the inner core and back again" (p. 34), mais d'une intuition à une construction de l'esprit "and back again."

⁴ M. Spitzer a bien vu (p. 71) que c'est dans cette pluralité (opposée à son "trait dominant") que réside la différence fondamentale entre sa méthode et la mienne. Cette concession suffirait à annihiler son effort pour m'assimiler à l'école française.

méthode et la française, si la première est dangereuse et la seconde sûre (p. 69; il oublie que j'en souligne les limitations). C'est que celle-ci permet de vérifier celle-là. Il n'y a rien de contradictoire à compléter l'une par l'autre, gardant de chacune l'élément le plus avantageux. C'est si évident que la surprise de M. Spitzer serait inexplicable s'il ne s'agissait pour lui de ne voir dans ma méthode que la partie "française." Il veut ignorer ce que je lui emprunte à lui-même: son attaque en serait gênée. Il ignore aussi ce qui m'est propre, et, employant le procédé même dont il m'accuse, il m'"impose" l'étiquette "école française," "et elle devient pour lui une tête de Turc, facile à abattre." Or, sans parler de mon désaccord total avec Marouzeau dans le domaine de l'ordre des mots (pp. 92 ss.), je me sépare fondamentalement de l'école française dans l'emploi de ses classifications de procédés (p. 18; moyens premiers d'investigation chez elle, chez moi procédés de vérification des réactions de lecteurs); j'ai, de plus, réorganisé les faits selon leur action psychologique, organisation explicative qu'on ne trouvera pas outre-Atlantique.

Prenant un autre biais, M. Spitzer me limite à n'être qu'un disciple zélé de Jean Hytier.⁵ Le nom explique assez sa mauvaise humeur: il a depuis 1950 laissé sans réponse la critique d'Hytier (*RR*, xli, 42-59), et pour cause! Elle formulait des doutes de principe sur les dangers de l'intuition spitzérienne, donnait des exemples irréfutables d'oubli des faits quand il ne cadrent pas avec le système intuitif, et dévoilait de soudaines prudences quand il s'agit de fermer le *cercle* en vérifiant l'intuition par les faits (surtout pp. 51-52, 58-59). Me présentant comme un fanatique à la suite, M. Spitzer fait coup double. Il peut, en critiquant le disciple, minimiser les objections du maître, et suggérer (p. 70) qu'elles n'étaient que taquinerie ou méfiance, surtout dogmatique, d'ailleurs prudente, et que l'élève seul est responsable de la condamnation qu'elles impliquent. Puis, se retournant vers moi, il m'accuse de "dépêcher dans une moitié de page l'œuvre de toute une vie de savant." Rétablissons les faits: le "point d'interrogation" d'Hytier était un courtois point final à des conclusions non fondées de Spitzer; d'autres ont précédé ou suivi Hytier (Bruneau, Levy, etc.); d'autres, avant moi, ont dit en peu de mots la prudence qui s'impose (Sayce, *Style in French Prose*, p. 2: une demi-page; Wellek et Warren: une page, etc.)—mais il était bon de me présenter comme un irrévérencieux isolé. Personne ne met en doute le génie

⁵ Quitte à dire, p. 72, que je me sépare d'Hytier sur l'interprétation des *tics*—toute la question du style inconscient, en somme.

de M. Spitzer, la finesse de ses interprétations littéraires. Son œuvre abonde en aperçus lumineux, en vues ingénieuses. Mais elle les doit à son talent, non à une méthode qui systématise les émotions personnelles. Ce que ses critiques déniaient à M. Spitzer, c'est le droit de confondre intuition et science, talent et méthode, car la méthode doit être universelle, applicable par tous, convaincante, et le talent est affaire de chance et son enseignement non transmissible.

M. Spitzer va répétant que ses adversaires ont peur du talent et de l'imagination.⁶ Modestement, mais contradictoirement, il m'accuse ensuite d'inventer quand je définis son intuition comme un "coup d'œil d'aigle": il ne serait en fait qu'un lecteur moyen, lui aussi, et ses observations, à la portée de tous (p. 70). Mais quand je lis dans *Linguistics and Literary History*, que ce "coup d'œil" initial est une "divination" (p. 19), que la seule garantie méthodologique du "coup d'œil" est que le lecteur-devin ait "talent, experience and faith" (p. 26), je suis forcé de voir en lui un phénix, si l'on ne veut pas de l'"aigle." Peu importe, du reste: même si nous acceptons le phénix comme moyenne, celle-ci est toute différente, on l'a vu, de mon concept du lecteur moyen, et la critique spitzérienne demeure un système impressionniste.

On le voit bien quand mon adversaire lit Gobineau. Impressionniste, elle procède par remarques tranchantes, fondées sur le sentiment que M. Spitzer a du français (même si ce sentiment était infaillible, il n'aurait encore pas plus de valeur, comme preuve, que l'autorité d'Aristote; mais il n'est pas valide pour un état de langue passé). Systématique, elle me discute comme si je confondais le style et la langue, ce qui n'est point.

M. Spitzer se demande si Gobineau avait un style *personnel*. Or c'est pour lui un style qui sache "transformer la langue donnée," par opposition au "style de la langue," les procédés que "tout écrivain français possédant sa langue pourrait employer" (p. 71). Imagine-t-on l'impossibilité pratique de la distinction? Pour savoir ce qui transforme, il faudrait connaître l'état de langue à l'époque de l'écrivain, et aussi une somme des réactions possibles des lecteurs qui nous

⁶ Voir Spitzer contre Ch. Bruneau, *FM*, xx, 3 (1952), p. 167. Par un décalage analogue, il accusa naguère l'école linguistique de L. Bloomfield de prêcher l'agnosticisme, parce qu'elle était anti-mentaliste (*Language*, xx, 4 [1944], 245-251). D'ailleurs, il arrive parfois à M. Spitzer de se sentir gêné par sa propre insistance sur le talent et la foi: n'a-t-il pas avoué un jour qu'il n'avait tant insisté sur talent et foi que parce qu'il s'adressait à un public américain (*Critique*, 98 [1955], 597)?

dirait où commence pour eux la transformation, où finit le bien commun. N'ayant rien de tel, M. Spitzer se contente de ses intuitions ou des vues de la critique, au nom desquelles il met Nerval, Hugo, Flaubert, Péguy, Claudel, Sartre dans son paradis, et damne Bourget, France, Bergson, et Gobineau.⁷

Bien plus, ce "style personnel" suppose que quelques faits privilégiés (ceux qui transforment) sont suffisants pour caractériser un auteur. Mais un style n'est pas les quelques éléments choisis par le critique comme la clef du reste, c'est la combinaison de ces éléments et du reste (à la portée de tous); ou même la *combinaison originale* d'éléments linguistiques entièrement ordinaires. Dire le contraire, c'est dire que Voltaire n'est pas personnel, qui pourtant se contentait de l'usage linguistique.⁸

C'est précisément une telle combinaison, de quatre éléments, que j'ai montrée chez Gobineau. M. Spitzer conteste qu'à partir de cet "homme" on puisse arriver "au style de Gobineau tel qu'il apparaît dans la plupart (?) des chapitres" (p. 73).⁹ C'est que ces chapitres démontent chacun une partie d'un mécanisme, et que ce mécanisme n'est Gobineau qu'une fois les rouages anonymes assemblés au dernier chapitre: c'est d'ailleurs pour cela que je ne traite de l'ironie à fond qu'à la fin, car elle n'est qu'une résultante. S'il est vrai que les procédés ne sont Gobineau que "pris ensemble," il ne faudrait d'ailleurs pas les croire aussi banals, isolés, que M. Spitzer l'affirme en détachant ses exemples de leur contexte,¹⁰ et en escamotant les preuves sur quoi j'appuie mes interprétations. Qu'on juge de quelques exemples.

Un "poème en prose" de Gobineau est banal "à son goût," "aujourd'hui" (p. 74). Il le compare à ceux de Baudelaire, comme il exige qu'une métaphore soit "claudélienne" pour être originale; bizarre critique, qui impose un auteur comme étalon arbitraire de la perfection dans un genre; ainsi les néo-classiques condamnaient *Hernani* parce que Hugo n'est pas Racine; erreur qui indigna M. Spitzer chez les autres (*Ling.*, 124-5, 129 n. 10). Ailleurs, la lecture de Céline (n. 3) rend Spitzer exigeant en matière d'invectives: on ne saurait faire grief à Gobineau de n'avoir pu connaître ce modèle.

⁷ N'est-il pas typique des flottements de l'intuition, qu'on pourrait, en suivant M. Spitzer, exclure Flaubert et Sartre, et béatifier au moins Bergson?

⁸ Voir Spitzer, *A Method of Interpreting Literature* (1949), pp. 64-101.

⁹ M. Spitzer essaie même de reconstituer Péguy avec une combinaison incomplète de traits gobiens. Jeu gratuit: on pourrait ainsi trouver La Calprenède dans Racine, Racine dans Campistron.

¹⁰ Par une segmentation qu'il reprochait à Sayce (*Critique*, 98 [1955], p. 601).

M. Spitzer critique les syllepse de Gobineau parce qu'elles seraient moins fortes que celles de Dickens ou Cervantès: or un fait de style ne peut être jugé qu'en fonction de sa langue, d'une mentalité nationale. M. Spitzer trouve *prototype* peu remarquable: cependant il l'est, pour les contemporains de Gobineau; M. Spitzer omet de mentionner les preuves que j'en donne. De même le "banal" style indirect libre ne l'était pas à une époque où il venait à peine de s'établir (p. 72). La répétition voulue, le style oral font bien partie "des habitudes du style français parlé"; mais la transposition de ces habitudes dans un contexte littéraire leur donne une originalité stylistique.¹¹

Mettre sur le même plan *imbéciles*, *drôles*, et *brutes* (p. 73 n. 3) n'est un "manque de pensée forte et claire" que pour M. Spitzer; injures semblables en français moderne parlé, ce sont des mots différenciés en français littéraire. Les *imbéciles* sont les 'impuissants' (pour Gobineau, les conservateurs); les *brutes*, les 'animaux' (le prolétariat) sont les instruments des *drôles*, les 'malins' insolents (les politiques profiteurs). Même légèreté dans le rapprochement de *glace de la colère* et du *cœur*, qu'enfin la *glace* atteint de Hugo (p. 73): la *glace* de l'âge est, en effet, banale; mais elle n'a rien à voir avec celle de la colère, qui reste "inouïe."

En somme, M. Spitzer substitue ses impressions subjectives de lecteur de 1958 à l'analyse des conditions de la création littéraire, et du goût, et de la langue d'il y a un siècle; quand les faits le contredisent, il les balaie avec esprit. Cela prouve que la critique impressionniste doit rester la "bête noire" des étudiants du style. Et les "bons" auteurs n'ont pas besoin d'être "mystérieux": ils sont complexes, voilà tout; le chercheur objectif les déchiffre sans exclure ceux de leurs aspects que son goût personnel l'empêcherait de comprendre. Si l'aigle spitzérien ne volait pas si haut, il trouverait qu'il y a originalité littéraire dans l'emploi nouveau des moyens stylistiques de la langue commune.

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¹¹ Comme l'a dit Spitzer lui-même à propos du style parlé dans l'ode de Claudel (*Ling.*, pp. 202, 204, 225 n. 27, etc.). J'ai montré (p. 139 n. 1) que la chaîne généalogique est un procédé populaire: est-elle pour autant banale chez Voltaire?

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